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Laws prohibiting racial discrimination in employment are now a
familiar component of our legal system. There is, however, a growing
uncertainty as to the limits of the obligation imposed by these laws, and
this uncertainty often creates a dilemma for employers and enforcement
agencies. Increased efforts to enforce or to comply are met with the
claim that preferential treatment is being given to blacks and that such
preferential treatment violates the law. On the other hand, decreased
efforts are met with equally forceful protests that whites are receiving
preferential treatment and that, too, violates the law.
The limits of any law are in large part determined by details of
history and language. In these respects fair employment laws vary
greatly. But central to all these laws is a common regulatory device-
the prohibition against discrimination. Fair employment laws regulate
by prohibiting employers from discriminating on the basis of certain
individual traits, such as race, religion, national origin, or sex, and by
authorizing or establishing procedures or remedies to induce or coerce
employers to comply with that prohibition. My concern is with this
common regulatory device, the antidiscrimination prohibition, particul-
larly as it applies to race. I address myself, not to any single fair em-
ployment law, but to a simplified and abstract version that simply
commands employers not to discriminate against any person on the
basis of his race or color. Analysis of this prototype will not set the
limits of any single fair employment law; but it may identify the
underlying theory of laws prohibiting racial discrimination in employ-
ment, and that seems to be the first step in understanding the limits of
the obligation imposed by such laws.
In analyzing prohibitions against racial discrimination, one aphorism
constantly recurs-that of color blindness. Its genesis can be traced to
the dissent of Justice Harlan in Plessey v. Ferguson." Since then, the
aphorism has played a dominant role in the interpretation of anti-
discrimination prohibitions, regardless of the activity covered, whether
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it be public education, jury selection, voting, housing, public accommo-
dations, or employment. Quite apart from what Justice Harlan in-
tended, the message conveyed by the metaphor is that the essence of the
obligation not to discriminate is for the pertinent decision-maker not
to take color or race-any color or race-into consideration. The
effect of blindness is to treat all colors as normative equivalents, and
thus the metaphor is particularly handy in expressing an opposition to
increased enforcement on the ground that such enforcement will result
in preferential treatment for blacks.
In some areas, such as education and voting,2 there is a growing
recognition that in some instances it is consistent with the antidiscrimi-
nation prohibition to take race into consideration. Indeed, some fairly
well-established doctrine concerning antidiscrimination prohibitions
forbids that race be ignored. Although there is considerably less
experience in construing the antidiscrimination prohibition of fair em-
ployment laws, the available doctrine and enforcement experience
suggest that in the employment context too the emerging vision of the
law is conscious of color. There are limits to that vision, and I believe it
important to identify them. But these limits are complex and subtle,
and the limits in employment differ from those in other areas of human
activity. The norm of color blindness ignores this, and thus in my judg-
ment provides little understanding of the legal obligation imposed by
fair employment laws.
I. TiE THEORY OF FAIR EMPLOYMENT LAWS
AND THE NORM OF COLOR BLINDNESS
Fair employment laws confer benefits upon a class of persons, namely,
the actual and likely victims of discrimination. In the case of the pro-
hibition against racial discrimination, that class consists predominantly
of Negroes. At least on the federal level, enactment was largely a
response to patterns of discrimination against Negroes; the resources of
public enforcement agencies have been committed primarily to induc-
ing or coercing employers not to discriminate against Negroes; and
Negroes were intended to be and, I would venture to guess, have turned
out to be the primary and immediate beneficiaries of the prohibition
against racial discrimination.
2 Elsewhere I have addressed similar issues relating to the assignment of students
among public schools, Racial Imbalance in the Public Schools: The Constitutional Con-
cepts, 78 HAav. L. REv. 564 (1965), and to voting qualifications, Gaston County v. United
States: The Fruition of the Freezing Principle, 1969 Sup. CT. REv. 379. Although I will
draw heavily on the analyses in those articles, my approach is premised on the view that
the antidiscrimination prohibition has different contours as it applies to different areas of
human activity.
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The supporters of fair employment laws are not unrealistic about the
race of the class upon whom the law confers its direct benefits. It is
black. But the desire to help blacks is qualified. It is qualified, first, by a
recognition that discrimination against Negroes violates certain princi-
ples that attach no particular importance to which color happens to be
the basis of the employment decision. Thus the prohibition is couched
in terms of "race" or "color"-without specifying which race or color.3
Second, the law contemplates conferring only a limited benefit. It does
no more than prohibit businessmen from making employment decisions
on the basis of race or color-a criterion whose use would in any event
impair rather than advance productivity and wealth maximization for the
individual businessman and for society as a whole. These two qualifica-
tions make the conferral of benefits on blacks particularly palatable,
ethically and politically, to the political majority. It is from these
qualifications that the norm of color blindness emerges.
A. The Aims of the Law: Securing Equality for Negroes
Laws prohibiting racial discrimination in employment are inex-
tricably linked to the goal of securing for Negroes a position of
"equality." There are, however, two senses to "equality" in this context.
One is equal treatment. Individual Negroes should be treated "equally"
by employers in the sense that their race should be "ignored," that is,
not held against them. This sense of equality focuses on the starting
positions in a race: If color is not a criterion for employment, blacks
will be on equal footing with whites. The second sense of equality-
"equal achievement"-looks to the outcome of the race. It relates to the
actual distribution of jobs among racial classes and is concerned with
both the quantity and the quality (measured, for example, by pay level
3 The assumption is that the legal prohibition of the fair employment law reads: It is
unlawful to discriminate against an individual because of his race or color. This is quite
different from a prohibition that reads: It is unlawful to discriminate against a Negro
because of his race or color. It should be noted, however, that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1964),
derived from the Civil Rights Act of 1866, is close to the latter pattern. It reads:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same
right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be
parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and pro-
ceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens,
and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and
exactions of every kind, and to no other.
Following the Supreme Court construction in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 US. 409
(1968), of 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1964), another law derived from the Civil Rights Act of 1866,
§ 1981 has recently been construed by lower federal courts to prohibit racial discrimina-
tion by private employers. Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Int'l Harvester Co., 427
F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1970); Sanders v. Dobb Houses, Inc., 63 CCH Lab. Cas. 9511 (5th
Cir. 1970); Copeland v. Mead Corp., 3 CCH Empl. Prac. Dec. 8058 (N.D. Ga. 1970);
see Comment, Racial Discrimination in Employment Under the Civil Rights Act of 1866,
36 U. Cm. L. Rlv. 614 (1969).
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and social status) of the jobs. Jobs should be distributed so that the
relative economic position of Negroes-as a class-is improved, so that
the economic position of Negroes is approximately equal to that of
whites. Disproportionate unemployment and underemployment of
blacks should be eliminated or substantially reduced.-
These two senses of equality are linked in fair employment laws, but
it is not clear which is the goal of the law. Under one interpretation, the
aim of a fair employment law is to secure equal treatment, and although
equal treatment might alter the actual distribution of jobs and lead to
equal achievement, such a result would be only incidental. Under an
alternative interpretation, the aim is equal achievement, and the
guarantee of equal treatment-the antidiscrimination prohibition-is
the chosen method for equalizing the distribution of jobs among racial
classes.
The distinction between these two views of the aim of the law is of
little moment if it can be assumed that equal treatment will lead to
equal achievement. But the assumption may be incorrect. It is conceiv-
able, and indeed likely, that even if color is not given any weight in
employment decisions, and in that sense equal treatment obtained,
substantial inequalities by race in the distribution of jobs will persist
in the immediate and foreseeable future.
Persistent inequalities in job distribution may be atributable to factors
unrelated to particular employment decisions (that is, the conduct regu-
lated by fair employment laws). For example, at any one point in time
unemployment rates differ from industry to industry, from region to
region, and from employer to employer; and disproportionate unem-
ployment of blacks may be due to a heavy concentration of blacks in the
industry, region, or business enterprise that has at any one moment the
greatest unemployment. This unequal distribution may be due to
custom, individual preference, or actual or imagined discrimination in
areas other than employment, such as housing.5 It may simply be due to
the fact that for blacks the starting point in the labor market was in the
South and in agriculture. The concentration of blacks in nongrowth
4 For a review of recent statistics indicating disproportionate unemployment and under-
employment rates by race, and the variations in these rates over time, from city to city,
from industry to industry, and on the basis of sex and age, see Cassell, Chicago 1960-1970:
One Small Step Forward, 9 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 277 (1970); Hiestand, Equal Employ-
ment in New York City, 9 INDusRAL RELATIONS 294 (1970); Marshall & Van Adams,
Negro Employment in Memphis, 9 INDusTRIAL RLATIONS 308 (1970); Doeringer & Piore,
Equal Employment Opportunity in Boston, 9 INDusTRAL RELATiONS 324 (1970); Schmidt,
Los Angeles: Show, Little Substance, 9 INDUSTRWAL RELATIONS 240 (1970).
5 See, e.g., Kain, Housing Segregation, Negro Employment and Metropolitan Decentral-
ization, 82 Q.J. EcoN. 175 (1968); Mooney, Housing Segregation, Negro Employment and
Metropolitan Decentralization: An Alternative Perspective, 88 Q.J. EcON. 299 (1969).
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industries and regions, or business enterprises, may be corrected over
time as the unemployed relocate themselves; but that takes time, and
whites will also be relocating.
Inequalities in the actual distribution of jobs between the races
might also be due to the decisions of individual employers-the subject
regulated by fair employment laws. One need not resurrect any notions
of "innate inferiority" to explain this possibility. One need only be
realistic about the historical legacy of blacks in America--one century
of slavery and another of Jim Crowism. This legacy may result in in-
equalities in the actual distribution of jobs in several ways.
First, even if race is not used by an employer, his decisions may be
based on criteria that do not seem conducive to productivity and that,
because of the legacy, give whites an edge. In an industrial system where
whites have a preexisting edge, rules that prefer relatives of the existing
work force (nepotism) or those who started working for the firm at an
earlier point in time (seniority) are examples of such criteria. The color-
blind version of fair employment laws emphasizes the negative proposi-
tion that race is not a permissible basis for allocating jobs, but it does
not purport affirmatively to catalog the permissible criteria, requiring
that they all be conducive to productivity.
Second, even if the employer does not use race and uses criteria ap-
parently conducive to productivity in his employment decisions, the
historic legacy may have left blacks with several types of disabilities.
One disability might be motivational. Conceivably, this legacy of slavery
and discrimination has been responsible for the lessening of motivation
of the class, making its members less willing to compete aggressively for
the opportunities that are open or less willing to submit to industrial
discipline. The legacy may have also made it more difficult for Negroes
to acquire the references necessary to evaluate future promise. Finally,
the legacy may have left the class without the qualities, abilities, skills or
experience that efficiency-oriented employment criteria demand. This
impact of the legacy need not be confined to the older members of the
class. For younger blacks, not directly exposed to slavery or Jim
Crowism, the disabilities might be "inheritable." The disabilities may
have affected family structure, which in turn has an impact on a child's
aspirations and on the guidance available. The disabilities also may
have affected family wealth, which has an impact on the child's ability
to acquire the training or credentials necessary to compete more suc-
cessfully.
Thus the distinction between the two views of equality is real. The
8 See generally Duncan, Inheritance of Poverty or Inheritance of Race?, in ON UNDEa-
srrmIING POVERTY 85 ( D. Moynihan ed. 1969).
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question that has to be asked is whether the goal of the antidiscrimina-
tion prohibition is equal treatment or equal achievement, and a great
deal may turn on the answer to that question. For the equal treatment
goal will constitute one, though only one, of the pressures to depart from
the norm of color blindness. If equal achievement is the goal of the law,
and, as may be the case, it is not obtained by color blindness, the desire
to improve the relative economic position of blacks will create a greater
temptation to construe the legal obligation arising from the command
not to base employment decisions on race in a more and more "gen-
erous" fashion.7 There will be considerable pressure to construe the
central regulatory device in a manner that would bring the law closer
to the attainment of the alleged goal of equalizing the actual distribu-
tion of employment opportunities, and such a construction might well
entail giving preferential treatment to blacks. On the other hand, the
equal-treatment goal is more compatible with color blindness; it means
that blacks are treated the same as whites and thus would seem to be
achieved once all employment decisions are independent of the colors
of the prospective employees.
The choice between these views of the aims of the law may be dictated
by the language or history of the particular fair employment law in
question. However, more likely than not, the relevant language or
history, if any, will not be decisive. The choice will then reflect
primarily what the decision-maker believes the goal of the law ought
to be, and that in turn should depend, not on the decision-maker's
self-interest, but on the ethical foundations of these goals.
1. The Equal-Treatment Concept: Responding to a Particularized
Wrong. An employment decision is analyzable primarily as a decision
to allocate a scarce opportunity-a job. The paradigm situation is one
in which several individuals are competing for a limited number of
7 See, e.g., Blumrosen, The Duty of Fair Recruitment Under the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 22 RuTcras L. REv. 465, 466 (1968) ("The law will be deemed successful only when
the unemployment rate for minorities comes more into line with the unemployment
rates of the rest of the community. The elimination of minority differentials in unem-
ployment rates will be a true signal that equal employment opportunity does in fact
exist."); Cooper & Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under Fair Employment Laws: A General
Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring and Promotion, 82 HARv. L. RFV. 1598, 1670
(1969) ("This shift away from a restrictive focus on the state of mind of the employer
is essential to the effective enforcement of fair employment laws, not merely because
specific intent is difficult to prove, but because there is frequently no discriminatory
intent underlying the adoption of seniority and testing practices, or a wide variety of
other objective and apparently neutral conditions to hire and promotion. These con-
ditions are possibly the most important contemporary obstacles to the employment and
promotion of qualified black workers."). See also Comment, Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 and Minority Group Entry into the Building Trade Unions, 37 U. Cm. L. Rim.
328 (1970). See pp. 289, 300 infra.
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opportunities. A choice among these individuals is required, and the
question arises as to the appropriate criteria for that choice. A choice
made on the basis of an improper criterion--classified by the law as
"invidious" or "arbitrary"-is viewed as a particularized wrong. The
rejected individual is not being treated fairly.
Two attributes of the racial criterion account for the sense of un-
fairness engendered by its use as the basis of an employment decision.
The first is that an individual's race is not considered an accurate
predictor of his productivity. Fair employment laws reflect a rejection
of any views of innate inferiority and also a commitment to the princi-
ple that the choice among individuals for scarce opportunities should be
on the basis of the individual's merit.8 In the employment context this
commitment to the merit principle means that the individual business-
man is expected to choose the most productive individual, that is, the
best worker at any given wage rate.9 This will tend to maximize the
businessman's own wealth, and it will foster society's interest in ef-
ficiency-producing the greatest number of goods and services at the
lowest cost.
The second attribute is the absence of individual control. To judge
an individual on the basis of his race is to judge him on the basis of his
membership in a class where that membership is truly predetermined.
Fair employment laws reflect not only a commitment to the merit
principle but also a commitment to the principle that it is desirable to
judge individuals on the basis of criteria that are within his reach. Each
individual should, at least at some point in his life, have the power or
capacity to put himself in the position of satisfying the criterion. In-
dividual control is a value because it provides the prospect for upward
mobility, an important incentive to self-improvement and efficient
performance. Further, it is valuable because it rationalizes, and thus
makes more tolerable, the unequal distribution of status and wealth
among people in the society: failure is the individual's own fault.10 The
principle that the individual should control his own fate also assumes
that the allocation of scarce employment opportunities represents, to
some extent, a reward. The reward may serve an instrumental purpose;
it may be an incentive to develop the necessary qualities or skills or to
perform well. Or the reward or allocation may be, for the individual, an
end in itself. In either event, responsibility is a necessary condition for
8 See generally R. LANE, POLmiCAL IDEOLOGY (1962).
9 For an analysis of those employment decisions that are based on race and may none-
theless be conducive to greater productivity, see pp. 257-63 infra.
10 See generally Schaar, Equality of Opportunity and Beyond, in IX NoMos 228 (J.
Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1967).
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being rewarded, and individual control is a necessary condition for
responsibility.
In identifying these two attributes of race-unrelatedness to pro-
ductivity and the absence of individual control-I do not mean to
suggest that either attribute by itself would be sufficient to generate
unfairness. For example, there may be nothing unfair about making
promotion or layoff decisions purely on the basis of seniority, though
such decisions may be inefficient. Similarly, there may be no unfairness
in refusing to hire an individual because of a physical deformity that
is related to productivity, even though that deformity is congenital or
the result of a vicious attack by another. Instead, the suggestion is that
both these attributes, unrelatedness to productivity and the absence of in-
dividual control, are inherent in race, and that together they account
for the unfairness.11 The fact that both attributes coalesce in race should
not, however, obscure the difference between the lack of individual con-
trol inherent in race and that involved in a deformity that is congenital
or the result of a physical attack. Concepts such as "accident of birth,"
"bad luck," "misfortune," are often used to explain the presence of
such a deformity, suggesting that although the trait is not within the
individual's control, it is in some sense a matter of chance. But this ele-
11 Criteria other than race may, of course, be both unrelated to productivity and be-
yond individual control. When these criteria are used as a basis for allocating a scarce
employment opportunity, unfair treatment or a particularized wrong occurs in much
the same way as when race is used. Some of these criteria, such as sex and national origin,
are frequently included in the reach of fair employment laws; others, such as eye color,
are not. The selection among this universe of allegedly arbitrary criteria for inclusion
within the reach of the fair employment laws depends on various factors: the size and
power of the victim group within the total constituency; political strategies; some estima-
tion as to whether conduct based on those criteria is sufficiently widespread and so firmly
rooted as to warrant coercive intervention by the law; differences in the degree of un-
fairness; and, whether interfering with conduct based on these criteria would also serve
other permissible purposes. The usual absence of some of these arbitrary criteria, such
as eye color, from the reach of the fair employment laws may be due simply to these
factors. One cannot argue from their absence that there is no unfairness in using race
as a basis of allocating an employment opportunity, and that the aim of the prohibition
against racial discrimination is not to express legal disapproval of the unfair treatment
inherent in judging an individual on the basis of his race and to provide sanctions and
remedies to respond to such particularized wrongs. Compare Winter, Improving the
Economic Status of Negroes Through Laws Against Discrimination: A Reply to Professor
Sovern, 34 U. CHI. L. REv. 817, 819-20 (1967). It might also be noted that, while Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination on the basis of religion, sex
and national origin as well as discrimination based on race, it permits religion, sex or
national origin to be used as a criterion for employment "where religion, sex, or national
origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal
operation of that particular business or enterprise." § 703(3)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(l)
(1964). Race is quite noticeably omitted from this exception and thus Congress seems to
be reflecting a view that race-in contrast to these other traits--can never or very rarely
be thought of as a "bona fide occupational qualification."
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ment of chance is not present with race; a child's race is not an accident
or a matter of luck. It is not an aberration. A child's race is not only
beyond his control but, perhaps more importantly, totally predictable.
And it is perhaps this characteristic of race that has the most deadening
impact on the prospect of upward mobility-one of the central values
served by the principle that deems it desirable that an individual control
his own fate. Members of the disfavored race must contemplate an
inferior position, not only for themselves, but for their children, their
children's children, and indefinitely on into the future.
Because of these attributes-unrelated to productivity and beyond
individual control-allocating an employment opportunity on the basis
of race constitutes a particularized wrong. There may, of course, be
adverse practical consequences that flow from the conduct that gives
rise to the wrong. To be denied a job may lessen income; it may frus-
trate a strong personal desire to get that job, to pursue a particular
career, and to work with certain people; or it may cause an adverse
psychological or emotional reaction. But it is important to distinguish
between the particularized wrong inherent in denying a person a job on
the basis of his race and the practical consequences that flow from that
conduct. The particularized wrong-the unfair treatment-exists in-
dependently of these consequences to the individual, and is perceived
without regard to an actual measurement of the consequences. It arises
from the attributes of race, not from the consequences to the individual.
It is this reason, and not just the lack of a feasible alternative, that, in
my judgment, accounts for the fact that the antidiscrimination prohibi-
tion is so constructed that a violation of it does not depend upon an
assessment of the actual consequences to the individual victim of the
unfair treatment.
Nor does the violation of the antidiscrimination prohibition turn on
whether the particular employment decision in question results in ad-
verse consequences to society (for example, a decrease in overall produc-
tivity or social mobility). This may simply be a function of feasibility;
a contrary view would probably create great uncertainties in enforce-
ment and result in a rule that would be a most uncertain guide to those
employers wishing to comply voluntarily. But I think that the structure
of the prohibition is also a function of the fact that the unfairness of
any particular employment decision based on race exists without regard
to the consequences of that decision to society. The unfairness of using
race as a basis for allocating jobs may be derived from certain ethical
principles, such as the merit principle or the principle of individual
control, which we in turn consider generally beneficial to society. But
a distinction must be made between, on the one hand, justifying certain
1971]
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ethical principles and, on the other hand, recognizing particularized
conduct inconsistent with those principles to be wrongful. 12 The ethical
principles in question may be ultimately justified by a utilitarian assess-
ment of their overall beneficial role in society or on the view that they
are among those few principles upon which universal assent can be
imagined. However, once justified, they take on a life of their own,
quite apart from their so-called ultimate justification, and particularized
conduct inconsistent with them is perceived as "wrongful." The wrong-
ful quality of the particularized conduct exists without in each instance
relating the conduct to the so-called ultimate justifications, that is,
without a judgment as to the utilitarian consequences of that partic-
ularized conduct to society as a whole and without in each instance
imagining the outcome of taking a universal poll on the correctness of
the particularized conduct.
2. The Equal-Achievement Concept: The Improvement of the Rela-
tive Economic Position of Negroes. The ethical basis for a law seeking
equal treatment seems clear: Under the view that race is an arbitrary
criterion, unequal treatment--disadvantaging Negroes because of their
color-is one form of unfair treatment, a particularized wrong. How-
ever, the ethical basis for equal achievement-as an independent and
distinctive goal of the law, and not merely as a possible incidental con-
sequence of equal treatment-seems more uncertain to me. This un-
easiness stems primarily from the redistributive quality of the equal-
achievement goal. This goal not only entails an improvement in the
position of Negroes from what it is now but also an improvement in
comparison to that of other groups. "Equality" is a relative concept; it
involves a comparison. Since whites are the economically dominant
racial group, a concern with equal achievement is basically a concern
with the relative economic position of Negroes as compared to whites.
Moreover, because of scarcity, the achievement of one group will be at
the expense of the other. There is a symmetry to each achievement:
what one group gets, the other does not. Even assuming an expanding
economic pie, the improvement of the relative position of Negroes means
that they get a larger slice of the increment, that Negroes are benefited
more from the expansion than whites.13 The redistributive aspect of this
12 See Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, in 1955 PHILOSOPICAL REv. 64. See also Rawls,
Justice as Fairness, in JusncE AND SocIAL PoucY 80 (F. Olafson ed. 1961); Rawls, Distributive
Justice, in PHILOSOPHY, POLrrIcs, AND SoCIETY 58 (P. Laslett & W.G. Runciman eds.
1967); Rawls, Distributive Justice: Some Addenda, in 13 NATURAL L.F. 51 (1968). Rawls'
conception of justice is premised on a view that everyone or nearly everyone is risk
averse; but I fail to perceive the basis for that premise.
13 It has been maintained that an expanding economy would increase the demand
for labor, and that would improve the relative position of Negroes. See Anderson,
Trickling Down: The Relationship Between Economic Growth and the Extent of Poverty
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goal is even clearer assuming a static pie. And since neither the legal obli-
gation nor the enforcement of fair employment laws is conditioned upon
increasing demand for labor, due account must be taken of the situation
where the pie is static. The ethical questions posed by the equal-
achievement goal then are twofold. Why should society seek to obtain for
Negroes a larger slice of the pie? How large should that slice be? There
are several possible answers to these questions. Yet each is to some
extent unsatisfactory.
a. Self-interest of blacks. An explanation couched in terms of the
self-interest of blacks is inadequate. As a factual matter, the redistribu-
tive goal may indeed be a function of the class' self-interest and the
class' political power, derived from its numbers and its ability to inflict
costs (for example, street crime, urban riots) on an otherwise unrespon-
sive society. But this self-interest of the class obviously does not provide
a normatively adequate basis for enactment of a law or a guide for in-
terpretation and enforcement of it. There would be no ethical basis for
distinguishing the self-interest of this particular group (blacks) from
that of any other group (for example, whites, Protestants).
b. Redistribution from the rich to the poor. An approach that seeks
to justify the redistribution in the same terms as one that would justify
redistribution of wealth from the "rich" to the "poor"'14 seems to be of
little significance here. For the redistribution in favor of blacks is not
likely to be at the expense of the "wealthy." The jobs held by the
"wealthy" are not likely to be the ones that Negroes, as a class, are
competing for now; a few Negroes may be competing for those jobs,
but their economic position is probably atypical of the class and not
easily classified as "poor." The competitors for the same positions are
likely to be in the same economic class; a higher proportion of blacks
than whites can be classified as "poor," but blacks constitute a smaller
portion than whites of those persons who can be classified as "poor."
Among American Families, 78 Q.J. EcoN. 511, 512 (1964); Tobin, On Improving the Eco-
nomic Status of the Negro, 94 DA.DALus 878 (1965). The theory is that an increase in
demand for labor will benefit those standing at the end of the hiring queue. But I
do not understand why the increase in demand for labor will necessarily benefit those
at the end of the queue more than those at the front. Those standing at the front of
the queue are not stationary; they are likely to move into the higher-paying, more attrac-
tive jobs (get the benefit of the growth) and leave the lower-paying, less attractive jobs
(that are not eliminated) to those at the end of the queue. If this occurs in a period of
expansion, the relative position of whites and Negroes will not be materially altered by
the expansion. There is some empirical evidence to suggest that that is what occurred
during the 1960's. Doeringer & Piore, supra note 4, at 329, 335-36, 338-39; Marshall & Van
Adams, supra note 4, at 317-18.
14 For the identification and analysis of those principles, see W. BLum & H. KAsvxN,
JR., THn UNEsy CASE roR PROGREssv. TAXATION (1963).
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The equal-achievement aim calls for a justification of a redistributive
program on behalf of a racial, rather than an economic, class.
c. Efficiency. Considerations of efficiency do not seem to justify a
redistribution in favor of blacks, or any racial class. One societal assump-
tion, evidenced by fair employment laws, is that race is not a predictor
of productivity. That assumption would apply equally if the redistribu-
tion were in favor of black (rather than white). A redistribution pro-
gram in favor of blacks may be consistent with considerations of ef-
ficiency and greater productivity under certain limited conditions (that
is, when the program does no more than prohibit employers from judg-
ing blacks on the basis of criteria, such as nepotism, that (a) are likely
to minimize the blacks' share of the job market and (b) are not related
in any significant way to productivity). Efficiency may not be sacrificed
if that redistribution occurs. But the question still remains: Why should
it occur?
d. Furtherance of certain social objectives. Redistributing jobs in
favor of blacks may be looked on not as an end in itself but rather as a
means of achieving other societal objectives. Whether redistribution
can be justified in such instrumental terms depends upon the con-
tribution redistribution will make toward the achievement of an ob-
jective, the availability of more effective alternative means for achieving
the objective, and the importance of achieving that social objective
when compared to the costs, economic or ethical, of redistribution.
(i) Maintenance of public order. The improvement of the relative
economic position of the racial class may be necessary to maintain pub-
lic order. This assertion assumes that blacks, as a class, believe that they
should get a larger slice of the pie and that they attach sufficient im-
portance to this aim to risk achieving it through unlawful activity, rang-
ing from ordinary street crime to riots. Obviously, society has an in-
terest in preserving peace, and it may decide that, even with continued
use of the criminal laws, peace cannot be maintained unless the relative
economic position of blacks is improved. But this merely shows that in
some situations it may be expedient to redistribute to a racial class, not
that it is right. And even the expediency of redistribution in these cir-
cumstances may be doubted because it invites all other classes to engage
in similar conduct for furthering their selfish claims. This particular
social objective-maintenance of public order-provides no basis for
differentiating between these assertions of self-interest. It is not sufficient
that the class feels its claim is "just."
(ii) Integration. To some extent, society seems committed to the
goal of integrating public education on the theory that racially
segregated education is either educationally undesirable or constitutes
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a denial of equal protection of the laws. 5 Because there are certain values
in drawing attendance boundaries on the basis of geographic criteria,
racial segregation in residential patterns will limit the capacity of school
boards to achieve integration. For this reason, and perhaps others,16
society has an interest in insuring that the relative economic position
of blacks is improved so that a significant number of them will have
the financial means to move into white residential areas and out of the
ghetto. That this may be a justification for redistribution cannot be
completely denied, but its significance is far from clear. Two questions
are crucial: (1) Is the goal of integration so important that society is
willing to effect a redistribution greater than would occur if employ-
ment decisions were not based on race? (2) Can it be fairly assumed
that an increase in the relative economic position of Negroes will result
in a significant increase in residential integration? These questions can-
not be answered by a simple "yes/no." But the answers to both ques-
tions must tend toward the affirmative before an independent role for
the redistributive goal can be predicted on its relation to integration;
and the evidence for an affirmative answer to at least the second ques-
tion seems sparse. There are many other factors besides inequalities in
wealth that are responsible for ghettoization, and these will persist even
if redistribution lessens the inequalities.
(iii) Black self-esteem. The concern with actual distribution of jobs
also may be rooted in a concern with the image that blacks are thought
to have of themselves if, regardless of the reason, all the "important,"
"prestigious" or "responsible" jobs are held by whites, or if, regardless
of the reason, a disproportionate number of blacks are unsuccessful in
their competition for the desirable jobs. Under this view it is thought
important to society for blacks to see members of their class in high-
ranking jobs, and thus develop self-confidence and pride, which might
in turn have beneficial social consequences. At best, the force of this
approach seems limited. The alleged beneficial social consequences
flowing from this increased self-esteem are quite indeterminate. The
approach calls for redistribution primarily in a limited range of jobs,
one far narrower than those covered by the fair employment laws. It is
addressed to the highly visible and highly prestigious jobs. Finally, if it
is understood or even assumed that the redistribution occurred to a
greater extent than if race were not held against Negroes, doubt would
15 For an analysis of the alleged value of integrating public education see Fiss, Racial
Imbalance in the Public Schools: The Constitutional Concepts, supra note 2, at 567-70;
U.S. OFFIcE oF EDUC., DEP'T OF HrEALTH, FDUc., & W=LFARE, EQUAUrY OF EDUCATIONAL
OPPORTUNITY (1966) (Coleman Report).
16 See Kain & Persky, Alternatives to the Gilded Ghetto, in THE PuBLic INTERF r (Win-
ter 1969).
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be cast on the value of the achievement. This is particularly true if re-
distribution were pushed beyond the point to which merit criteria would
lead. There would be no confidence that the black got the high-status or
better job because he was, in a merit sense, "better" than competing
whites.
e. Responsibility for the inferior economic position. The last reason
that might justify giving blacks a larger slice of the pie may reflect col-
lective responsibility. The legacy of the class-as slaves and as victims
of serious discrimination in all phases of life-in large part absolves the
class of responsibility for its inferior position and fixes responsibility for
that inferior position on society. Societal responsibility derives not only
from widespread individual participation in the practices and institu-
tions that kept blacks in an inferior position (slavery, Jim Crowism)
but also from the impact of public laws and government agencies. In-
dividual action conferring benefits on behalf of someone may be
prompted and justified by recognition of responsibility for the helped
individual's plight. And the suggestion is that society's action-the fair
employment law-can be justified on the basis of a recognition of
responsibility for the inferior economic position of Negroes. In large
measure, I think, the redistributive goal is rooted in these sentiments. 17
These sentiments are not transcendental. No sentiment is. Even if
the acknowledgment of collective responsibility may justify a redistribu-
tive goal, it is still unclear how far the law is willing to pursue this goal.
In general terms, the pursuit of this redistributive goal will be mod-
erated by three factors. The first is society's willingness to impose sac-
rifices on itself (decreases in total wealth) or on particular individuals
(competing white employees or individual businessmen). An unlimited
pursuit of this redistributive goal can, of course, interfere with society's
pursuit of other goals; indeed, it may so impair incentives
for self-improvement as to undermine the productive system. Second,
I believe that the pursuit of this redistributive goal will be moderated
by a loss of confidence in the legacy theory as one necessarily moves
from aggregate class concepts ("Negroes," "society") to individual con-
cepts ("Negro applicant for a job," "individual employer"). Even
though Negroes as a class may not be responsible for their inferior eco-
17 Immediately following the Civil War these sentiments perhaps were reflected in
the establishment of the Freedmen's Bureau and proposals to give (on a time basis) the
newly freed slaves 40 acres of land. Cox, The Promise of Land for the Freedmen, 45
Miss. VALLEY HisT. Rrv. 413 (1959); G. BENTLEY, A HISTORY OF THE FREEDMEN'S BuRaAu
(1955). E. ROZWENC & T. LYONS, RECONSTRUCTION AND THE RAcE PROBLEM (1968). The
establishment of the Indian Claims Commission in 1946, 25 U.S.C. § 70 (1964), primarily
to deal with land daims, and, of course, the reparations system in Germany following
World War II reflect similar concerns. See generally Hughes, Reparations for Blacks?,
43 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1063 (1968).
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nomic position, perhaps there were things this particular Negro could
have done to put himself in a better competitive position. Or, even
though society may be responsible for imposing disabilities on blacks
and thereby impairing their competitive position, perhaps this partic-
ular employer bears little, if any, responsibility. At the enactment stage,
the concern may not be with individual applications, but such applica-
tions are inescapable if the law is to be enforced and surely foreseeable at
enactment. Third, the pursuit of the redistributive goal is likely to be
moderated by a realization that many of those who are competing with
the blacks are also in an inferior economic position, that redistribution
in favor of blacks may perpetuate or aggravate their inferior position,
and that society bears a heavy responsibility for their position too. The
legacy of blacks in America may be truly unique, in that the institution
of slavery was generally delimited by the color black and few groups
have encountered the systematic, widespread and long-enduring ill-
treatment inherent in Jim Crowism laws and institutions. But other
groups also may have been disadvantaged by societal institutions and
left with disabilities.
These nagging doubts do not preclude using the legacy notion to
justify societal pursuit of a redistributive goal, but they are likely to
moderate society's enthusiasm for pursuing the goal. The unanswered
question is to what extent it will be moderated.
B. The Need for the Law: The Possibility of Self-Regulation
An interesting feature of the merit principle is that in a market
economy it is to some extent self-enforcing. Employers have an obvious
financial self-interest in making employment decisions on the basis of
merit. And competition, if not greed, requires or leads them to pursue
that self-interest with vigor. Hence, to the extent that a fair employ-
ment law does nothing more than prohibit businessmen from making
employment decisions on the basis of a nonmerit factor-race-a ques-
tion arises as to the need for the law.
The need for the law may be predicated on certain intangible values.
For example, it may be valuable to reaffirm the principle of fair treat-
ment. This affirmation may produce such nonquantifiable benefits as
encouraging confidence in the legal system and encouraging those who
believe themselves to be vulnerable to discrimination to compete ag-
gressively for jobs. Reliance upon self-regulation entails a silence that
may be pregnant with contrary implications for the likely victims.
The need for the law may also be more firmly rooted. Self-regulation
may not materialize because of certain features of our market economy.
In a number of situations the self-enforcing capacity of the merit prin-
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ciple is limited, and a risk is created that the employment decision will
be based on a nonmerit criterion, such as race.'8
1. Limits on Profits. For certain industries, government limits profits
and thereby removes some incentive for choosing the most productive
workers. The employer may not be able to capture the increased return
attributable to cutting labor costs, and thus the employer could indulge
a discriminatory preference and base his employment decision on race
without decreasing his wealth.
2. Equal Productivity. The individuals competing for a certain job
may be approximately equal in productivity. This may be the case
where the job is highly routinized and can be supervised at low cost. In
that situation the competition will ordinarily take place in the realm of
wages-who will work for the least amount-rather than in terms of
ability. However, wage-rate competition may be precluded because (a)
the competing workers are prepared to work at the same wage level or
(b) there may be artificial floors on the wage level, such as those estab-
lished in minimum wage laws or in collective bargaining agreements.
Under these circumstances, the power of the market to preserve the
integrity of the merit principle is virtually nonexistent. The employer
can base his decision on race without decreasing his wealth.
3. Satisfying a Taste for Discrimination in Exchange for Decreased
Wealth. An employer may be willing to suffer decreased monetary
wealth due to lessened productivity in exchange for the satisfaction
of his taste for discrimination. The taste for discrimination may be
rooted in many factors, such as the employer's psyche, his political ambi-
tions, or an interest in preserving a social structure that relegates blacks
to an inferior position; and the satisfaction of that taste is a type of
payment that may offset the decrease in monetary return which may
result from disregarding the merit principle. Such an employer may be
able to survive in the market because (a) his competitors have similar
tastes, (b) he may be selling his product or service in a market where
competition is not vigorous, or (c) he may be willing to accept a sub-
normal return on his capital.
4. Bureaucratization. Considerations of efficiency may lead the busi-
ness organization to delegate employment decisions to relatively un-
supervised agents (for example, the staff of the personnel office). These
agents may be more removed from the discipline of the marketplace
than is the businessman as a seller. Because these agents usually do not
18 See generally G. BEcK.R, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (1957); Alchian & Kessel,
Competition, Monopoly and the Pursuit of Economic Gain, in AsPEcrs OF LABOR Eco-
NOMICS 157 (1962); Demsetz, Minorities in the Market Place, 43 N.C.L. REv. 271, 276 (1965);
Winter, supra note 11.
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share in the increase of wealth attributable to increased productivity,
they have less incentive to apply the merit principle rigorously. Thus
these agents may be more able or willing than the employer, at least in
the short run, to violate the merit principle to satisfy their own taste
for discrimination or that of others whom they wish to please.
5. Employee Control of the Employment Decision. The employment
decision may be responsive to, delegated to, or usurped by employees.
The classic instance is the union referral system in the building trades.
There the contractor formally retains control over the employment
decision but in practice the contractor uses the union referral system
as his exclusive source of workers. He takes whomever the union sends.
And the workers who control the union are removed, at least in the
short run, from some of the discipline of the employer's market and
thus are more able to indulge their taste for discrimination. The
workers are also likely to perceive it to be in their immediate short-run
interest to limit the supply of labor (so as to minimize their competi-
tion) and to establish criteria for selection, retention and promotion
that would benefit themselves without necessarily benefiting the em-
ployer. These criteria may well be nonmerit ones.
6. Mistakes. Lack of adequate information about the productivity
of individuals may lead the employer to make mistakes. He may make
incorrect assumptions about the productivity of blacks because of the
general prevalence of racial stereotypes in our society, derived from
widespread prejudices and myths generated under the slave regime; or
he may make a mistake because of the lack of social and commercial
contacts between races, contacts which are often necessary to obtain
accurate information about applicants for employment. Moreover, pre-
vious employment experience is often the most reliable source of in-
formation for accurately applying the merit principle, and it may be
unavailable to Negroes because of previous discrimination. The as-
sumption here is that it would pay the employer to obtain accurate in-
formation because the increased productivity would offset the costs of
obtaining the information, but the employer is unable to perceive
what is in his best interest because of these prejudices and stereotypes.19
In the above situations the merit principle is not likely to enforce
itself; the prospects for effective self-regulation are slim. One irony is
that the need for a fair employment law arises in part from the existence
of other laws (such as minimum wage laws, laws protecting uniofi hiring
halls, laws limiting profit levels, and laws limiting entry) that impair
the effectiveness of the market; by interfering with the market, these
19 For an analysis of the problem where such a use of race might not be mistaken (i.e., is
not based on stereotypes), see p. 257 infra.
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laws impair the capacity of the merit principle to protect itself. The
need for the fair employment law, to the extent that it arises from
statutes with a contrary effect, may simply reflect society's reluctance to
abandon these other forms of government regulation-it wishes to
have its cake and eat it too.
It should also be noted that the enactment of a fair employment law
need not be based on the empirical judgment that these situations
describe the employment market as a whole. For one thing, the enact-
ment of the law may be predicated on the ethical judgment that, regard-
less of how infrequently the merit principle is violated, it is extremely
important for the legal system to respond to each individual instance
of racial discrimination. The existence of a law prohibiting murder is
not based on an empirical judgment that we are all murderers, but on
the ethical judgment that it is extremely important that the legal
system respond whenever there is a murder. Moreover, adjustments
could be made in enforcement. The prevalence of situations where the
merit principle is unable to protect itself may vary over time, from
region to region, from industry to industry, and also from employer to
employer. But even with an omnipresent fair employment law covering
all areas, all industries and all employers, and not limited in time, ad-
justments can be made in the decision to enforce or not to enforce, and
in the kind of relief sought and given.
In a situation where the merit principle is self-enforcing, employers
who deviate from the principle impose costs on themselves. In the
other situations there is a need for the imposition of additional costs on
the nonmerit employer, and the enforcement of fair employment laws
supply those costs.20 Indeed, in some instances fair employment laws
impose costs on those, such as the building trades unions, who in the
short run might not otherwise feel the cost of using a nonmerit criterion
in any direct fashion and who, in fact, would benefit because the labor
supply would be restricted. Costs imposed by fair employment laws may
take various forms-compensatory damages, punitive damages, the ob-
ligation to pay plaintiff's attorney's fees, the risk of losing customers
(possibly the government), and the psychological or social impact of
being adjudged guilty of violating a law that embodies an ethical norm.
More drastic kinds of legal sanctions, such as fines and imprisonment,
are not usually authorized; and because of continued nonuse, the fear
of criminal contempt for disobedience of an injunction is not im-
mediate. The softness of the available sanctions is one of the unique
features of fair employment laws as a regulatory device. This may be a
20 Landes, The Economics of Fair Employment Laws, 76 J. PoL. ECON. 507, 508-13,
545-48 (1968).
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sign of society's less than full commitment to the antidiscrimination
prohibition, or it may indicate either faith that compliance will be
voluntary or a recognition that the legal obligation arising from the
laws is so unclear that punitive sanctions would be inappropriate.
C. The Costs of the Law
All laws have costs, and fair employment laws are no exception. I do
not identify these costs in order to determine whether there are less ex-
pensive alternatives.21 Rather, I am interested in further illuminating
the theory underlying fair employment laws by making it clear what
price society is willing to pay to achieve the purposes served by these
laws.
1. Frustration of Personal Preferences. One set of costs arises from
the frustration of personal preferences. A desire to exclude blacks from
the work force because of antipathy, a desire to preserve a certain type
of social structure, or a desire to associate only with whites, obviously is
a personal preference. But, at a minimum, a fair employment law pro-
hibits indulgence of preferences through exclusion of blacks, because of
their color, from the work force or from better jobs. This frustration of
desire, preference and choice not only has possible individual psycho-
logical consequences, but also runs counter to general principles in
society insuring freedom of association and the freedom to act upon
personal preferences.
Frustration of these personal preferences cannot be ignored on a theory
of a political bargain-that the political majority is willing to trade the
satisfaction of these personal preferences for the potential increase in
total wealth. The view that the law will increase total wealth depends
on estimations of the level of wealth without the law (where reliance is
on self-regulation), the cost of enforcing the law, and the likelihood that
increased use of other nonmerit criteria (for example, nepotism) might
negate the effect of abolition of the race criterion. And even if it were
possible to make these judgments and be assured that wealth would be
increased by the law, it seems impossible to know how much that wealth
would increase, that is, whether it would increase to a level at which the
21 For an analysis of some of the alternatives, some of which are not inconsistent with
the continued existence of fair employment laws, see generally Brozen, The Effect of
Statutory Minimum Wage Increases on Teen-age Employment, 13 J. LAw & ECON. 109
(1970); Demsetz, supra note 18 (the free market, and the ability of minorities to offer
wealth compensation in the form of lower wages to offset the taste for discrimination);
Doeringer & Piore, supra note 4, at 327, 336-37 (manpower training programs and
their relationship to fair employment laws); Sky, Defense Procurement Preferences as a
Remedy for Subemployment: A Comment, 82 HARv. L. Rxv. 1266 (1969); Tobin, supra
note 13, at 884 (fiscal and monetary policies increasing the demand for labor); Winter,
supra note 11 (the market).
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majority would be willing to engage in the trade-off. Instead, the
frustration of these personal preferences must be acknowledged as one
price society is willing to pay to achieve the aims of the law. The satis-
faction of discriminatory personal preferences of whites entails partic-
ularized unfairness and continued relegation of Negroes to an inferior
economic position. The law reflects the value judgment-the choice-
that eradication of these evils is more "important" than preserving op-
portunities to vent discriminatory associational desires.
The choice need not be premised only on a hierarchy of values; it
may well rest on two other considerations. One is a regard for the
associational desires or personal preferences of blacks. The satisfaction
of the associational interests and personal preferences of whites might en-
tail the frustration of the desire of blacks to work in a certain company, to
pursue a particular career, or to obtain a certain level of income. From
the perspective of preserving associational freedom and preferences
there is a standstill. The second consideration is that fair employment
laws do not completely frustrate these associational desires. These laws
may, to some extent, allow satisfaction of associational desires by
exempting from their coverage the very small employer.22 The assump-
tion is that where there are few employees, associational desires are
likely to be most intense. Moreover, a fair employment law may be un-
derstood as proclaiming that a business enterprise is an inappropriate
forum for the satisfaction of these associational desires. Under a legal
regime such as the federal one, where antidiscrimination prohibitions
cover public education, housing and public accommodations as well,
the individual is remitted to private social clubs and to the choice of
friends for the purpose of satisfying these associational desires.
2. Economic Costs. Aside from frustration of personal preferences,
fair employment laws, even under the regime of color blindness, involve
economic costs. Once again, it would be disingenuous to ignore these
costs on the ground that in the long run they will be offset or canceled
by increased total wealth due to increased productivity. That view
requires an estimate of the economic costs and benefits of the law,
which seems, at least to me, unobtainable. The most that can be said
is that the color-blind version of the fair employment laws, effectively
and cheaply enforced, is consistent with increased productivity. This
says very little. It seems more realistic to recognize the economic costs
22 Employers with less than 25 employees are exempt from Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1964). On various occasions, including October 1, 1970,
legislation has been passed by one of the houses changing the number from 25 to 8. 112
CONG. REc. 9153 (1966); S. 2453, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). Perhaps in a similar vein,
Title VII also exempts the employment practices of private membership clubs. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(b)(2) (1964). See pp. 257-58 infra.
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of the law and to assume that the justification for incurring these costs
consists of the nonquantifiable value attached to the aims of the law.
a. The costs of enforcement. Initially, it may seem that the costs of
enforcement are relatively insignificant because a fair employment law
may be self-executing-almost like the nineteenth amendment. This
can occur in four ways. First, the passage of the fair employment law
communicates society's disapproval of race-based employment decisions.
That general disapproval might be internalized, so that those respon-
sible for the employment decisions conform their conduct to society's
sense of moral propriety, if for no other reason than to avoid feelings of
guilt. Second, the very existence of the law (perhaps coupled with a
low-cost method of enforcement, such as consent decrees) enables an
employer who previously discriminated only to avoid alienating cus-
tomers, white workers or the community to explain to others that he
is not "voluntarily" ending his discrimination and to assure them that
his competitors are obliged to follow a similar policy. The mere
presence of the law might enable him to pursue his self-interest vigor-
ously and to apply scrupulously the merit principle without incurring
the loss of sales, goodwill, or white workers that might otherwise flow
from nondiscriminatory employment practices. Third, enforcement
action against one employer, making him more merit-oriented, may
make his competitors, through the operation of the market, more merit-
oriented in their employment decisions. The effect of one enforcement
action can be easily generalized. Fourth, a credible, but general, threat
of enforcement may induce employers to conform their employment to
the merit principle because satisfying the taste for discrimination be-
comes more expensive. The employer is exposed to the new risk of a
successful enforcement action against him, with its attendant costs.
These four factors have operated with considerable efficacy in obtain-
ing "voluntary compliance" with the antidiscrimination prohibition in
another area of economic activity-public accommodations. The same
phenomenon seems to be occurring in housing, where the extensive use
of a low-cost enforcement method-consent orders-seems to be the
rule rather than the exception. In employment, however, the discrimi-
natory pattern seems, at least to the enforcement agencies, more intract-
able; the prospect of voluntary compliance slim; and the costs of
enforcement higher.23
23 This statement should be regarded as nothing more than a hypothesis based on per-
sonal impressions, and one that needs empirical testing. If the impression is correct, the
difference might be attributed to (a) differences in the competitiveness of labor markets
contrasted to sales markets, (b) the stringency of the demands of the enforcement agencies
in the different areas, or (c) different degrees of willingness of those accused of dis-
crimination to admit violations.
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The costs of enforcing a fair employment law may in part be viewed
from the perspective of the plaintiff and the tribunal. Such costs would
consist of the resources used by private and public agencies in investi-
gating, prosecuting, adjudicating, mediating, or negotiating claims.
There is a corresponding set of costs for the defendant-those actually
consumed in defending against claims of racial discrimination. Of
course, both sets of costs may be incurred whether or not the claim
has merit, and their level may be independent of the outcome of the
adjudication.
The risk of incurring litigation costs may, of course, result in nothing
more than punctilious compliance with the law. On the other hand,
the risk may also lead the businessman concerned with wealth maximi-
zation to insure himself against these costs. This insurance would
minimize the risk of having to defend against a claim of discrimination
and facilitate the defense against any such claim. The price of this
insurance can be called an "anticipatory cost" and must be viewed as an
economic cost arising from the risk of enforcement.
One form of insurance consists of racial-hiring-hiring, without
regard to merit, some of those on behalf of whom claims are likely to
be asserted.2 4 At least the appearance of compliance is established. The
price of the insurance is the decrease in productivity attributable to
the departure from the merit principle. This may be less than the price
of defending (even discounted for the unlikelihood of an enforcement
action). Another form of insurance may be the institution of a formal-
ized selection system. Such a system would entail abandonment of
subjective criteria (for example, "I liked him"), the substitution of
so-called objective employment criteria (for example, the professionally-
developed, standardized written test), and the establishment of a
record-keeping system indicating why an applicant was rejected. The
formalized system minimizes the risk of prosecution and reduces the
cost of defending because the employer can easily point to performance
under these objective criteria (for example, a score on a written test) as
his basis for rejecting the individual who charges discrimination based
on race. Here the price of insurance is the increased administrative
costs of the formalized system, and these may be less than the discounted
cost of defending.25
24 M. SOVERN, LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON RAcIAL DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 124 (1966);
Winter, supra note 11, at 834-35.
25 Certain criteria utilized in these formalized systems, such as seniority and performance
on a standardized test, are now being challenged as violative of the fair employment laws.
See pp. 296-310 infra. However, it is clear that the adoption of these systems often coincided
with the passage of a fair employment law; and considering the fact that such systems
restrict discretion that might otherwise be abused by excluding blacks, see United States
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b. The costs of the obligation: prohibiting efficient decisions based
on race. Thus far the prohibition against racial discrimination has been
viewed as consistent with greater productivity for the individual busi-
nessman and for society. One exception arises when a businessman must
expend resources to defend against a bad claim or insure against the
assertion of such claims. Perhaps these costs are inherent in any form of
government regulation. However, there is another exception, which I
find more problematic. It involves the costs imposed on the businessman
by virtue of the obligation of the law itself. The mere fact that race
itself is not a merit criterion does not mean that the efficient business-
man cannot use it for purposes of increasing his productivity. There
are at least four situations where the law's prohibition against the use of
race precludes the good businessman from engaging in efficient con-
duct.
(i) Race as a symptom of merit. Some businessmen may concede that
race itself is an arbitrary criterion and yet use race in employment
decisions on the theory that it is symptomatic of other qualities that
are predictive of productivity. For example, they may think that black
is a symptom of poor education or high turnover rate. They realize that
the symptomatic use of race may not be free of error; obviously, not all
Negroes have a poor education or change jobs frequently. But race is
an easy criterion to apply, and the good businessman may decide accu-
rately that the savings derived from applying this easy criterion (ad-
ministrative costs) will offset the costs of occasional mistakes, that is, the
loss of increased productivity that might result from excluding Negroes
from his work force or from using them only for nonskilled jobs.
(ii) Catering to consumers' or clients' taste for discrimination. A
second situation arises when increased productivity due to compliance
with the antidiscrimination prohibition will be offset by decreased
sales. This would be true under the following conditions: (a) Consumers
or clients prefer a firm that discriminates against Negroes by either not
hiring them at all or keeping them in inferior positions. (b) Consumers
or clients are willing to pay enough to cover the increased costs of
labor due to nonapplication of the merit principle. (c) Consumers or
clients are able to police the performance of the particular employer to
insure that he is discriminating against Negroes. (d) There are alterna-
tives to the consumers or clients so that they need not do business with
the complying employer. A decrease in sales would occur only if they
v. Louisiana, 380 U.S. 145 (1965) (holding an interpretation test invalid because it rested
unfettered discretion on the registrars), and considering the insurance function of such
systems, it is not fair to assume that the choice of criteria reflects a desire to "evade"
solely because of the time sequence between the passage of the law and the adoption
of the formalized system.
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are able not to consume or to switch to producers of the goods or
services who would, for business or other reasons, satisfy their discrimi-
natory preference by not complying. Mere coverage of the industry by
a fair employment law will not insure industry-wide compliance, nor
will the usual enforcement action directed against the single firm.
(iii) Personnel conflicts. The businessman may decide to limit the
number of blacks working for him in preference to increasing the risk
of costly personnel conflicts. His thinking is that hiring more blacks
will cause the whites to be more antagonistic (because their prejudice
has a tolerance level that may be exceeded), resulting in disputes and
conflicts among the workers in the course of the workday. This might
well be the judgment of the good businessman if three conditions are
satisfied: (a) He is correct in his beliefs that increasing the number of
blacks will increase the risk of personnel conflicts. (b) His productivity
would be decreased if he had only blacks. (c) The costs in productivity
due to the exclusion or limitation of blacks are offset by the decrease
in costs that might otherwise arise because of the personnel conflicts or
because it would be necessary to employ more supervisors to minimize
the personnel conflicts generated by higher levels of black employment.
(iv) Wage differentials. Under a limited set of conditions, a business-
man who is not interested in satisfying a taste for discrimination but
only concerned with wealth maximization may be led to institute wage
differentials. These wage differentials reflect more than asserted differ-
ences in the employment opportunities of blacks and whites. If that
were the only factor, the good businessman would hire all black
workers at the low price, inducing whites to offer their services at that
price; there would be no wage differential. However, a wage differential
might be instituted by the good businessman given two conditions: (a)
The first condition is that there are not enough black workers with the
relevant skills or abilities to fill the needs of the employer completely,
so that the employer must have some white workers. This is certainly
imaginable considering the legacy of the black class and the disabilities
imposed by that legacy. (b) The second condition is that in order to
induce whites to work, it is necessary to pay them more than is paid
blacks of equal skill and ability. This need to pay whites more may in
turn have two explanations: (1) White workers demand compensation
for being unable to satisfy a desire they may have not to associate or
work with blacks, a desire that blacks are not as likely to have; or (2)
white workers have more job mobility (i.e., alternative opportunities)
than blacks because there is more discrimination in the general em-
ployment market against blacks than against whites of the same ability.
Conceivably, fair employment laws could be written or construed to
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permit the businessman to engage in those four practices under the
limited conditions specified. The theory could be that the employer's
decision was not based on the individual's race, but on the employer's
interest in wealth maximization. Or it might be said that in these
instances the general assumption that race is irrelevant to productivity
is wrong. However, that option has not traditionally been chosen. Instead,
fair employment laws have been understood to prohibit the use of race
as a symptom, to prohibit limiting the number of blacks in deference
to customers' taste for discrimination or as a means of avoiding person-
nel conflicts, and to prohibit the institution of the differential-wage
structure. They have been understood to prohibit these practices with-
out regard to whether they are instituted by the good businessman, the
one who has no interest but to maximize his wealth. In this regard the
norm of color blindness has been pushed to its ultimate limit; a blanket
prohibition or per se rule has been adopted. In my judgment, there is
good reason for this choice,, wholly apart from speculations regarding
long-run increases in society's wealth.
First, less than a blanket ban would involve a risk of abuse. The bad
businessman-for example, one who uses race simply to indulge his
own taste for discrimination--could easily assert a defense to a claim
of discrimination. It would be extremely difficult and costly in terms of
time, resources and effective achievement of the aims of the law to
determine, in the course of an investigation or an enforcement proceed-
ing, whether this particular businessman used race to maximize wealth
and whether the conditions specified were satisfied. A justification cast in
terms of risk of abuse assumes that it is only in the exceptional case that
the use of race could be justified in terms of wealth maximization; per
se rules are designed to reflect the usual situation. And there may be
some basis for this assumption. Each of the efficient uses of race turns
on the presence of carefully specified conditions, and fair employment
laws may reflect the empirical view that generally these conditions will
not be satisfied, that efficiency can explain only a limited number of
instances where race is used. Fair employment laws may be predicated
on the view that there is little basis for believing that race is a symptom
of another criterion that is predictive of productivity; or that an inte-
grated work force will produce personnel conflict; or that there is a
shortage of qualified black workers that would require the employer,
for considerations of efficiency, to have some white workers and to com-
pensate the white workers for his inability to satisfy their taste for dis-
crimination. Serious questions can be raised as to the correctness
of these assumptions; but, to the extent that these are the factual
assumptions underlying the fair employment laws, and, to the extent
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that they are correct, the efficiency-justified uses of race are likely to be
viewed by the law as exceptional situations, and the blanket prohibition
would be rational. The law is entitled to be unconcerned with the ex-
ceptional instances and to formulate an uncomplicated per se rule of
law addressed to the likely, rather than the unlikely, situation.
Second, failure to respond to efficiency-based uses of race may have
the effect of "honoring" or "legitimating" racial discrimination that
cannot be so justified and that ultimately makes a restriction on blacks
conducive to short-run efficiency. The employer's use of race may be
attributable to considerations of wealth maximization, but in each in-
stance the use of race relates to someone's taste for discrimination
against blacks. It may not be that of the employer. It may be that of his
customers, white workers, other employers, or other sellers. This is
clearly the case in the customer-catering, personnel-conflict, and wage-
differential situations. It is also true when race is used symptomatically.
It is likely that the color black became symptomatic of other qualities
(for example, poor education or high turnover rate) that are related to
low productivity primarily because of discriminatory institutions and
practices, past and present. All these discriminatory tastes and practices
would be "accepted" or "honored" if these uses of race were permitted
in order to further efficiency. To borrow a concept from the first amend-
ment area,26 it would give the bigot a veto. Indeed, in the differential-
wage situation the white workers would be provided with an incentive
to create the appearance of a taste for discrimination as a means of
bargaining for higher wages as the number of blacks hired increased.
Third, to the victim of the employment decision the appearance of
the conduct is identical, whether the use of race is efficiency-related or
not. The immediate dignitary, psychological, and economic impact on
him is identical, and a complicated explanation in terms of the business-
man's interest in wealth maximization and the relation of that to social
wealth is not likely to be either comforting or believed. It is not
irrational for the law to be responsive in part to appearances of injus-
tice, even at the risk of causing some short-run diseconomies. And
indeed more than just the appearance of injustice might be at stake.
The unfairness inherent in allocating a scarce opportunity on the basis
of race stems from two attributes of the racial criterion-unrelatedness
to productivity and the absence of individual control. In these four
situations the first attribute of race is no longer present; under the
conditions specified race would in fact be related to productivity. But
the other attribute remains. The individual is being judged on the
26 The analogy is to the "heckler's veto," H. KALyEN, JR., THE NEGRO AND THE FnRsT
A~mENmrr 140-60 (1965).
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basis of his membership in a class and that membership is truly pre-
determined. I am not certain whether this absence of individual con-
trol, even in the special sense connected to race 2 7 is itself sufficient to
render the use of race unfair; usually the question need not be faced
because the ordinary presumption, contradicted in these four situations,
is that the racial criterion is also unrelated to productivity. But it is
important to recognize that this attribute of race remains present even
in those situations where efficient decisions might be based on race, and
may help to explain the law's blanket ban on all uses of race.
Fourth, the good businessman does have some degree of responsibility
in these situations. That responsibility stems from his capacity, albeit
limited and not free from sacrifice, to work against the underlying prej-
udices. Holding him legally responsible is not likely to impose crippling
costs on any single businessman ("make him go broke," as opposed to
being unable to obtain that marginal dollar). It may even create an
incentive to work against the ultimate cause. Only in the situation
where race is used as a symptom of merit (for example, poor education
or high turnover rate) is it unrealistic to assume that the employer has
any significant capacity to deal with the underlying cause. In that situa-
tion the ban is not likely to lead the employer to improve the public
education system or to institute a compensatory training program. He
is much more likely to substitute another easily administered merit
criterion (for example, high school diploma or length of time at previ-
ous job) that might be as disastrous for blacks as the use of race. In the
other situations, however, there are things that the employer might
realistically do to combat discrimination. The threatened or actual
decrease in wealth might induce him to undertake corrective activities.
In the customer-catering and wage-differential situations, for example,
there will be an incentive to inform on his competitors who discrimi-
nate, for that would lessen his decrease in wealth. In these situations,
as well as in the personnel-conflict one, he has an incentive to "educate"
whites out of their taste for discrimination. The enforcement process
must start at some point, and it is not altogether unwise or unfair to
start with him. The other alternatives, such as proceeding directly
against those with the taste for discrimination or against all firms in
the industry at once, seem in most situations utterly unrealistic.28
27 See p. 242 supra.
28 Where employment decisions are made by individual firms, enforcement action em-
bracing all the firms in the relevant sales or labor markets will generally be unavailable.
A question would be raised about the fairness of the joinder, and whether the joinder
of all the employers would make the litigation or administrative proceeding more difficult
to manage and in that sense turn out to be counterproductive. Moreover, the policing
of the remedial order that might result would be difficult. This is not to deny that, on
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Fifth, there is no reason why wealth maximization of individual
businessmen must be the only value served by the legal system, or a
value that must not, under any circumstances, be sacrificed. This is
true even though a system legitimating and protecting individual
wealth maximization leads to the greatest total amount of goods and
services at lowest cost. There are other values to be served, and on occa-
sion they may justify regulation of economic behavior that limits the
capacity of individual businessmen to maximize wealth. A clear instance
of this is presented in the symptomatic use of race. Regardless of how
efficient it may be, the use of race as a symptom of a poor education,
and thus as a basis for denying jobs, creates the risk of perpetuating the
blacks' inferior economic position, which may in turn result in the
members of the class continuing to get a poor education because they
remain without the economic power to get the best education. There
may, of course, be other ways (for example, providing compensatory
education programs) to deal with the effects flowing from efficiency-
based use of race, and these may avoid requiring sacrifices by individual
businessmen. But there is no reason to believe that these programs will
involve less cost for society or that they are politically feasible.
The flat ban against the use of race as a basis for the employment
decision is not without its irony. The purported beneficiaries of the
law-Negroes--may, as a class, suffer adverse practical consequences.
The diseconomies we have been discussing may not stop at simply
decreasing the wealth of the businessman. The supply of goods may
be restricted because the incentive to the businessman is diminished or
the businessman may be able to pass on, through higher prices, some
significant portion of the increased costs due to the ban against efficient
decisions based on race. Negroes occupy a low economic position in our
occasion, some version of the omnibus enforcement action has been tried. See, e.g., United
States v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 36, 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969) (originally commenced
against several building trades unions in St. Louis when the members of these unions
ceased work on the construction of the St. Louis Arch because of the employment of
workers who were black and nonunion); Department of Justice Press Release, March 31,
1970, describing an agreement to end discrimination in craft, administrative, and clerical
jobs in the motion picture and television industries in Los Angeles (agreement signed by
the three major television networks, their four primary supporting craft locals, 73 motion
picture producers, their nine craft locals, the International Alliance of Theatrical Stage
Employees and Moving Picture Operators of the United States and Canada, and the Asso-
ciation of Motion Picture and Television Producers, Inc.). Even if it is assumed that
these omnibus enforcement actions are worth the effort, it should be noted that they are
incomplete because they do not deal with discrimination by employers who are outside,
for example, the construction industry in the case of the St. Louis Arch litigation or,
for example, employers who are outside the motion picture and television industry in the
case of the Los Angeles agreement. These employers may be outside the market for the
services; but they are part of the relevant market for labor.
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society and thus are likely to feel the brunt of diseconomies that result
in higher prices or shortages of goods and services. Moreover, a prohibi-
tion on racial wage differentials-a requirement of "equal pay for
equal work"--may lessen Negro employment. Under the ban, the
businessman loses some of the incentive to hire equally qualified black
workers (that is, the savings due to paying them lower pay), for he will
have to pay them the same as white workers. And if his costs are higher,
he will hire fewer workers, black and white, and the reduction in
employment opportunities is likely to hit blacks harder. The pa-
ternalism is clear. Some whites, and some blacks, are telling those blacks
who might actually benefit from a differential-wage structure that they
will not be allowed to accept that benefit because of concerns or
interests of the remainder of the class or society as a whole.
Possibly those responsible for fair employment laws did not perceive
these ironical consequences of a blanket prohibition. However, the
discovery of hidden costs does not mean that the enactment of the law
is irrational. For the reasons already discussed, these hidden costs might
be significantly less than the costs that might arise if there were no
blanket ban, and, in any event, they may simply be one part of the
price that society is willing to pay to achieve the more general aims
of the law.
II. DEPARTURm FROM THE NORM OF COLOR BLINDNESS:
LAw ENFORCEMENT TEcHNiQUES AND JUDICIAL DOCTRINE
CONCERNING THIE EMPLOYER'S OBLIGATION
The theory of fair employment laws formulated thus far is consistent
with and indeed supportive of the norm of color blindness. The formu-
lation is, however, incomplete in three important aspects: it does not
take account of the techniques necessary to enforce these laws effec-
tively; it does not consider the applicability of these laws to conduct,
such as recruitment, not involving a choice among competing individ-
uals; and it uncritically assumes that employment criteria innocent on
their face, such as nepotism, seniority, and testing, are beyond the
reach of the law. These are serious shortcomings. They pose questions
of prime concern to those charged with enforcing and construing the
laws. And in answering these questions, the aphorism of color blindness
has not helped, nor has it been respected.
To reject the aphorism is not to tolerate, nor to require, preferential
treatment based on race-either for whites or blacks. It is not to
ignore that the law is committed to an element of symmetry: it is as
unlawful to prefer blacks on the basis of their race as it is to prefer
whites on the basis of their race. The aim of the law may be to secure
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equality for Negroes, the most likely victims of racial discrimination;
but the chosen method for achieving this aim is to prohibit discrimina-
tion based on race or color-any race or color. The broad scope of the
prohibition-to cover discrimination based on race, without specifying
which race-may be attributable to political considerations. Or it may
be attributable to an ethical consideration, namely, that the particular-
ized wrong inherent in rejecting a black because of his color is also
present when a white is rejected because of his color. The color white
is as predetermined and as unrelated to productivity as the color black.
The white victim, too, is treated unfairly and unequally.
Arguably, there may be reasons for society to be relatively uncon-
cerned with this unfair treatment of the white victim. It may be as-
sumed that when the victim is white, and thus a member of the majority
racial group, the practical consequences of the unfair treatment will be
less than when the victim is black. The white victim may be better able to
find employment elsewhere. And the wrong may not be accompanied by
a dignitary harm; it is not likely to underscore a sense of inferiority.
The practical consequences to society might also be less; for example,
discrimination against the white might have little or no impact on the
general prospects of upward mobility. Moreover, even if unfortunate
practical consequences flow from the unfair treatment to a white,
society may be willing to permit, encourage or even require that blacks
be preferred on the basis of their color in order to further the aggregate
economic goal of improving the relative economic position of Negroes.
The attainment of social goals is not costless; tolerating this unfair
treatment to white victims may be part of the price society is willing to
pay to achieve this redistributive goal.29
However, these considerations are not relevant for determining
whether the law is violated.30 The law is structured so that a violation
29 If it can be assumed, for constitutional purposes, that the improvement of the
relative economic position of blacks is a permissible goal, an assumption that is probably
well-founded in light of the broad historical purposes of the thirteenth and fourteenth
amendments, it would be reasonable to conclude that the constitutional guarantee of
equal protection does not preclude government from pursuing this redistributive goal
in a manner that would inflict particularized wrongs on whites.
30 This is not to suggest that the enforcement agency, in deciding how to allocate its
scarce resources, would not be entitled to take into consideration the practical con-
sequences to the individual or to society of the conduct giving rise to the individual
wrong. This would be true whether the victim is white or black. Moreover, assuming
that the fair employment law is related to the goal of achieving equality for Negroes,
the public agency may well formulate a policy that will result in its scarce resources being
used predominantly, if not exclusively, to investigate and prosecute claims of racial dis-
crimination against blacks, rather than whites. But this would not alter the legal obliga-
tion arising from the law. The decision of an enforcement agency as to its area of primary
concern, based on considerations of efficiency and its perception of the aims of the law,
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does not depend on proof of practical consequences; and the particular-
ized wrong occurs without any actual assessment of practical conse-
quences to the victim or society, whether the victim is white or black.
Moreover, the importance abstractly attached to the redistributive goal is
of limited significance; even if redistribution or equal achievement is the
aim, the law is limited in the pursuit of that aim by the terms of the
law, which give firm support to the view that society is not prepared to
pursue redistribution to the point of inflicting particularized wrongs
on whites.
Thus the law is committed to a symmetrical stricture against pre-
ferential treatment based on race: preferring a black on the basis of his
color is as unlawful as choosing a white because of his color. This stric-
ture is, in my judgment, one of the important limits of the antidiscrimi-
nation prohibition. It would be a mistake, however, to equate it with
color blindness or to believe that the concept of color blindness ade-
quately expresses or identifies this limit.31 Law enforcement techniques
and judicial doctrine have been developed that involve significant
departures from color blindness and yet leave this stricture against
preferential treatment based on race intact.
A. Law Enforcement Techniques: The Use of Race to Insure Effective
Enforcement
1. Racial Record-Keeping for Enforcement Purposes. At one point
in the history of fair employment laws the requirement of color blind-
ness was taken in its most expansive sense. It was viewed as including a
ban on racial record-keeping. The antidiscrimination prohibition was
thought to preclude any form of record-keeping that identified the race
of employees or applicants for employment. This ban is probably at an
end. Indeed, not only is racial record-keeping by employers permissible,
but employers, unions, and joint apprenticeship committees covered by
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 are required to submit racial
census reports to one of the public enforcement agencies.3 2 Court
does not alter the "obligation" of the law. The obligation of the law-a statement as to
what the employer must do and must not do-is not reducible to a prediction of whether
the agency will punish him if he engages in certain conduct. The obligation provides
the basis for justifying the imposition of the sanction, not just the basis for predicting
whether the sanction will be imposed. See H.L.A. HAiRT, THE CoNcEPT oF LAw (1961).
The agency is free to bring a suit on behalf of a white, however occasional that might
be; and the white victim may himself bring a suit, and a defense predicated on the
reliance on the practices of public enforcement agencies should have little or no force.
31 Compare Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequal World: Equality for the Negro-The
Problem of Special Treatment, 61 Nw. U.L. Rv. 363 (1966).
32 29 C.F.R. §§ 1602.13 (employers), 1602.27 (labor organizations), 1602.20b (joint ap-
prenticeship committees), requiring reports to the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission.
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decrees often require the submission of similar reports to facilitate
monitoring of compliance by private and public enforcement agencies.33
The ban on racial record-keeping probably did not contribute
materially to voluntary compliance with the antidiscrimination prohi-
bition. The ban might have rested on the view that one way of prevent-
ing an employment decision from being made on the basis of the
arbitrary criterion-race-is to try to keep this information from the
decision-maker. But this is a virtual impossibility. Race is like sex and
not like religion. It is an easily observable trait, and at some point in
the process leading to the employment decision there is likely to be an
opportunity for this observation. For example, in the initial hiring
situation there is the personal interview; and when promotion or dis-
charge is involved, heavy reliance is placed on the recommendation or
evaluation of a foreman or manager who actually supervised the worker
and thus is likely to have seen him. Recording the race of the individual
on the initial application or on his personnel record provides informa-
tion that the decision-maker already has or could easily get. The law
may be color-blind, but there is no reason to assume that the employer
is.
The ban on racial record-keeping not only failed to contribute
materially to voluntary compliance; it also made enforcement of the
prohibition against racial discrimination more difficult and costly. It
kept information known or easily available to the decision-maker from
the enforcement agency, which does not have the same opportunities for
observation. This information is important to the agency if it uses racial
statistics for enforcement purposes; and the permissibility of those uses
is discussed in the next section. But the information is also important
to the enforcement agency even if the agency does not use racial statis-
tics and instead uses enforcement techniques of unquestionable pro-
priety.
Generally, there are two noncontroversial and highly persuasive
ways of detecting and proving racial discrimination. One is admission
by the decision-maker. Such an admission is, of course, unlikely,
especially where social mores disapprove of the conduct prohibited by
the law. A more generally available way of detecting and proving dis-
33 United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 10, 3 CCH Empl. Prac. Dec. 8068
(D.N.J. 1970); Scott v. Douglas & Lomason Co., 3 CCH Empl. Prac. Dec. 8006 (N.D. Miss.
1970); Trustees of Tufts College v. Volpe Constr. Co., 3 CCH EmpI. Prac. Dec. 8054
(Mass. Sup. Ct. 1970). See also United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d
836 (5th Cir. 1966), aff'd en banc, 580 F.2d 385, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967); Lee
v. Macon County, 267 F. Supp. 458 (M.D. Ala.), aff'd sub nom., Wallace v. United States,
389 U.S. 215 (1967); United States v. Plumbers & Pipefitters Local 73, 314 F. Supp. 160
(S.D. Ind. 1969).
[Vol. 38:235
Fair Employment Laws
crimination is through a method of comparison. This comparison
method has three steps: first, identification of the criteria for employ-
ment purportedly used by the employer; second, ascertaining how all
the applicants performed under these criteria; and, third, comparing
how well the successful white applicants satisfied these criteria compared
to black applicants. If the comparison shows that jobs are granted with
some regularity to white applicants who are, in terms of the criteria,
less qualified than the unsuccessful black applicants, the inference of
racial discrimination is compelling.
A necessary, though not sufficient, condition for establishing discrimi-
nation through the comparison method is for the enforcement agency
to know the race of individual applicants. In principle, an enforcement
agency could, even without racial record-keeping, identify the race of
each applicant by locating and then interviewing him or, if the segre-
gated patterns in housing and education continue, by making inferences
from the location of the individual's residence and from the schools he
attended (information often included on employment applications and
personnel records). But this would be an extremely costly, time-consum-
ing and generally inefficient process. A notation of race on the individ-
ual's personnel record is obviously preferable from the enforcement
agency's perspective, and it generally does not create any risks that the
employment process does not itself contain. In these situations a ban
on racial record-keeping makes little sense.
It is true that in Anderson v. Martin the Supreme Court held that
noting the race of candidates on a ballot was constitutionally impermis-
sible.34 But it is difficult to understand why a state would note race other
than to encourage racial choices in election. In our context, where the
issue is one of keeping records of the race of applicants for employment,
there is an independent legitimate purpose-to facilitate the enforce-
ment process. It is possible to imagine hypothetical situations where
there is no opportunity for observation prior to the allocation, or the
interviewer or foreman is unable to classify on sight and is either too
embarrassed to ask the applicant's race or afraid that asking might
create the suspicion of discrimination. In those situations, a rule that
precluded the employer from asking the race of the individual might
be conducive to compliance and thus would justify a gap in the records.
But this would be only an occasional gap; it would not render the
34 375 U.S. 399 (1964). The court rested its decision on the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment, reasoning that "by directing the citizen's attention to the single
consideration of race or color, the state indicates that a candidate's race or color is an
important-perhaps paramount-consideration in the citizen's choice, which may decisively
influence the citizen to cast his ballot along racial lines."
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remainder of the records useless, nor would it support a generalized ban
on racial record-keeping.
2. The Use of Racial Statistics for Enforcement Purposes. In attempt-
ing to enforce the prohibition against racial discrimination in other
areas, such as voting, public education and juries, the enforcement
agencies have used racial statistics in three ways: to trigger enforcement
action, such as the initiation of an investigation; 5 to shift the burden
of proof to the party accused of discrimination-making him prove that
he has not discriminated;86 and to formulate the goals of performance
required under a decree designed to stop a party from discriminating.37
Starting from the realistic assumption that Negroes, rather than whites,
are likely to be the victims of patterns of racial discrimination, in each
instance the concern has been with low numbers of blacks. That has
made the enforcement agencies and the primary decision-makers very
conscious of the color black.
Experience in enforcing the antidiscrimination prohibition in em-
ployment has been considerably less extensive than in other areas. But
there is every reason to expect that these uses of racial statistics will
have their analogs in employment, with the likely result that both
enforcement agencies and employers will become significantly color-
conscious.38
a. Racial statistics as a trigger to enforcement agencies. The receipt
of an individual complaint should not be a necessary condition for the
35 See, e.g., United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967); Letter of John W. Gardner, Secretary of HEW, to mem-
bers of Congress and Governors, printed in Hearings on H.R. Res. 8261 Before the House
Comm. on Rules, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1966), explaining that HEW used racial statis-
tics as administrative guides to determine whether an investigation would be appropriate
to determine whether free-choice school desegregation plans were working adequately. See
also Alabama NAACP State Conference of Branches v. Wallace, 269 F. Supp. 346 (M.D.
Ala. 1967).
86 See, e.g., Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587
(1935) (jury cases); United States v. Louisiana, 225 F. Supp. 353, 385 (E.D. La. 1963), aff'd,
380 U.S. 145 (1965) (voting case); Fiss, Gaston County v. United States: Fruition of the
Freezing Principle, supra note 2, at 393 n.43. As Judge Brown put it in Alabama v.
United States, 804 F.2d 583, 586 (5th Cir.), aff'd per curiam, 371 U.S. 37 (1962): "In the
problem of racial discrimination, statistics often tell much, and Courts listen."
37 United States v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 395 U.S. 225 (1965) (assignment of
faculty among public schools so that proportion of white and black teachers in each school
approximated the racial distribution of the faculty of the system as a whole); Dowell v.
School Bd., 244 F. Supp. 971 (W.D. Okla. 1965), afT'd, 875 F.2d 158 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
387 U.S. 931 (1967); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 311 F. Supp. 265
(W.D.N.C. 1970), cert. granted, 399 U.S. 926 (1970) (teachers and pupils should be assigned
so that all schools at various grade levels have the same proportion of black and
white teachers and students as there is in the system as a whole).
38 See generally Winter, supra note 11, at 831-35.
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commencement of an investigation by a public agency.39 While it is
true that the victim has an interest in complaining, he may not be
aware of the discriminatory basis of an employment decision. Moreover,
the individual may fear, perhaps with some reason, that filing a com-
plaint will impose significant costs on him, such as the risk of being
blacklisted and being exposed to subtle retaliations (especially in the
promotional process) against which the law cannot guard. Finally, the
victim may be unaware of the law or of the procedures for commencing
an investigation. There is thus some need for the public agency to be
self-starting-to initiate its own investigations without waiting for the
receipt of an individual complaint. And then there is the need to
identify those employers-out of the multitude covered by the law-
who should be investigated. One criterion, by no means the only one,
is the likelihood of a violation being found.40
To locate probable violations, the enforcement agency can use a
combination of factors. There are cultural factors (Where is the taste
for discrimination most pronounced?). There are also economic ones
(Where are the market conditions such that the taste for discrimination
can be indulged at least cost?). These cultural and economic factors
identify those situations with the greatest prospect for discrimination.
The agency can also use racial statistics, either alone or, for greater
effectiveness, in conjunction with the cultural and economic factors to
locate probable violations.41 The absence of Negroes or a very low
number of Negroes in the work force of the employer-a severe racial
imbalance-creates a suspicion that the employment practices of this
employer are unlawful.
This use of racial statistics is based on the indisputable proposition
that one necessary consequence of racial discrimination is racial im-
balance. If the employer discriminates against Negroes on the basis of
race, there will be no Negroes or very few. This use of racial statistics
does not imply that racial discrimination should be reduced to or
39 Blumrosen, Antidiscrimination Laws in Action in New Jersey: A Law-Sociology Study,
19 Rurr s L. Rxv. 189 (1965); Blumrosen, supra note 7, at 465-66; M. SovraN, supra
note 24, at 31-35.
40 A self-starting law enforcement agency might well be concerned with other
factors in identifying potential targets. For example, if the goal is viewed as one of equal
achievement, the number and quality of jobs that could be made available would be
particularly relevant; and whatever the goal, there would be an interest in geographic
and industrial dispersion. Such dispersion would broaden the threat of enforcement and
perhaps increase the likelihood of voluntary compliance by employers who would other-
wise be inattentive to their obligation under a fair employment law.
41 See, e-g., Cameron Iron Works v. EEOC, 3 CCH Empl. Prac. Dec. 8064 (S.D. Tex. 1970)
(less than 1% black and less than 2% Mexican-American white collar employees sufficient
to form the basis for the commencement of an EEOC investigation).
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equated with racial imbalance. 42 Such a reduction or equation would
confuse consequence with cause. There are causes other than racial
discrimination that may explain the identical statistical consequence-
absence or low number of Negroes. For example, imbalance might be
due, not to racial discrimination, but to a lack of the requisite skills in
Negroes (perhaps because of their legacy) or a lack of interest of blacks
in working for the employer (because of salary level, transportation
problems, or the absence of friends). However, since these racial statis-
tics are used merely to trigger an investigation, the likelihood of
this conceptual confusion is relatively low. The very purpose of
the investigation is to ascertain the true cause of this consequence, to
evaluate the "hunch" that the observed racial imbalance is caused by
racial discrimination.
b. Racial statistics as a basis for allocating burden of proof. This
second use of racial statistics also recognizes the distinction between
cause and consequence. The theory is that a total absence or very low
number of blacks in the work force is a permissible basis for an
impartial tribunal to infer that the employer has racially discriminated.
This inference is alleged to be strong enough to create a prima facie
case, casting a burden upon the defendant employer to come forth with
evidence to prove that the imbalance is not a result of his discrimination
and placing the risk of nonpersuasion on him.43
When the burden of going forward and the burden of persuasion are
reallocated on the basis of this imbalance, the distinction between cause
(racial discrimination) and consequence (racial imbalance) tends to be
blurred. There is a risk that the distinction will be only a "formal" one.
The reallocation of the evidentiary burden might be determinative of
the outcome. It may be extremely unlikely that the employer can prove
42 A different rule might prevail in public education, where the imbalance or segrega-
tion itself might have an independent significance under the view of Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), that "segregated education is inherently unequal." See generally
Fiss, Racial Imbalance in the Public Schools: The Constitutional Concepts, supra note 2.
In that article I took no account of the relationship between effective law enforcement
techniques and racial imbalance, and, instead, premised my analysis on the value of in-
tegrated patterns of student assignment-a value that has little counterpart in the employ-
ment context. See text at notes 15-16 supra.
43 See, e.g., Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 3 CCH Empl. Prac. Dec. 8021 (8th
Cir. 1970); United States v. Local 38, IBEW, 428 F.2d 144, 151 (6th Cir. 1970); United
States v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 36, 416 F.2d 123, 127 (8th Cir. 1969); United States
v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 415 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1969); Cypress v. Newport News Gen. & Non-
sectarian Hosp. Ass'n, 375 F.2d 648 (4th Cir. 1967); Chambers v. Hendersonville City Bd.
of Educ., 364 F.2d 189, 192 (4th Cir. 1966); Hawkins v. North Carolina Dental Soc'y, 355
F.2d 718 (4th Cir. 1966); EEOC v. Plumbers & Pipefitters Local 189, 311 F. Supp. 468
(S.D. Ohio 1970). See also Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 63 CCH Lab. Cas. 9504
(10th Cir. 1970); EEOC Decision 70-402, Feb. 6, 1970, CCH EMPL. PRAc. Gumr 8602.
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the cause of the imbalance to have been something other than racial
discrimination, or it may be extremely expensive for him to do so. In
recognition of this risk, special restrictions should be and generally have
been imposed on this use of racial statistics. One condition is that other
methods of proof be unavailable to the plaintiff, and a second is that the
inference of racial discrimination be supported by other evidence.
In general, reallocation of the burden of proof on the basis of racial
statistics is permissible only if the comparison method of proving
discrimination is unavailable. There are several reasons why it might
be: (1) The race of individual applicants may be unknown. (2) The
employees' records may be inadequate. The employer might not pre-
serve applications of unsuccessful applicants. He might not even main-
tain personnel records, or the records that are maintained may be
inadequate because they are limited in time or do not contain, for
instance, the test scores or a statement of the reasons for success or
failure. (3) The private plaintiff may not have the financial resources
to fill these gaps in the records or, even when the records are adequate,
to bear the costs always present in this method of proof. These costs are
significant when a large number of employees are involved over a signifi-
cant period of time. (4) The employer's decision may be based wholly
or in large part on subjective criteria ("He looked like a good worker
to me," "I liked him") that might mask discrimination. In order for the
comparison method to be used, some portion of the employer's criteria
must be "objective," in the sense that performance is quantifiable; they
must permit a ranking of applicants by an enforcement agency that is
independent of the employer's. For example, it is possible indepen-
dently to rank individuals on the basis of scores on a written test and
thus to use the comparison method, but not if the employment decision
rests wholly on judgments such as "I think he has the right kind of
personality." The presence of some subjective elements will not pre-
clude this method. If a pattern emerges where unsuccessful blacks do
better on the objective portion than the successful whites, an inference
that the subjective portion of the selection process was being abused for
discriminatory purposes would be permissible.44 (5) There may be no,
or very few, Negro applicants, and thus no one to compare with the
successful white candidates. This absence of Negro applicants may not
be the employer's fault, and in that instance it would be somewhat un-
44 This inference might be neutralized to some extent if it were found that even though
unsuccessful black applicants had higher objective qualifications than the successful
whites, there were also unsuccessful whites with objective qualifications higher than the
successful whites and as high as the unsuccessful blacks. It should also be noted that if
there are several criteria, and even if all are objective, it is necessary for an independent
ranking that a weight be assigned to each component of the selection process.
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fair to reallocate the burden of proof on the basis of the racial statistics.
On the other hand, the absence of Negro applicants may be linked to
past practices of the employer that discourage Negroes from applying.
Or the absence of Negro applicants may be linked to current recruit-
ment practices of the employer that reach only the white community.
Even assuming that these practices themselves are not violative of the
law, if they can be established, it would not be unfair to reallocate the
burden of proof on the ground that the absence of Negro applicants
makes the comparison method unavailable. In these situations, holding
the plaintiff to a strict standard of proof, such as the comparison
method, and refusing to reallocate the burden of proof on the basis of
the imbalance, would tend to honor past discrimination or create in-
centives for recruitment practices that would not reach the Negro com-
munity.
The permissibility of using racial statistics to reallocate the burden of
proof also depends on the presence of what can perhaps be considered
"supportive facts." The observed racial imbalance, even coupled with a
showing that the comparison method is unavailable, is unlikely by itself
to justify reallocation. A variety of facts can play this supportive role,
although some are not likely to be acknowledged by the tribunal: (1)
There may be one or two isolated incidents of racial discrimination. 45
By themselves these incidents may not be of significance-they may be
viewed as "mistakes" or the act of some low-level personnel officer who
has been replaced. If that were all, general injunctive relief on behalf of
a class might be inappropriate because either the statute or general
equitable principles require a pattern of conduct that creates a substan-
tial risk that the discriminatory conduct will recur. But these isolated
incidents lend credibility to the inferences arising from the statistics
that the employer has pursued a general discriminatory policy. (2) The
inference may be supported also by the presence of suspicious circum-
stances surrounding the employment decision. For example, even
though the Negro got the job, he did so only after the classic "run-
around."4 6 The runaround may itself be a form of discriminatory con-
duct (unequal treatment), subject to equitable relief; but it might also
lend credibility to the inference from the imbalance and thereby
warrant more general injunctive relief against the employer, pro-
hibiting him from discriminating on the basis of race in the choice of
applicants. (3) The inferences from racial imbalance may be strength-
ened by considering the context in which the employment decision is
45 See, e.g., Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 3 CCH Empl. Prac. Dec. 8021
(8th Cir. 1970); United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 36, 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir.
1969); EEOC v. Plumbers & Pipefitters Local 189, 811 F. Supp. 468 (S.D. Ohio 1970).
46 See, e.g., Dobbins v. Local 212, IBEW, 292 F. Supp. 413, 425 (S.D. Ohio 1968).
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made.4 ' For example, the plant might be located in a community where
patterns of racial discrimination have been found by courts or are with
good reason believed to persist in voting, public accommodations, jury
selection or education. Or the economic context may be one like the refer-
ral system of building trade unions, where the prospect for self-regulation
by the merit principle is slim. When racial imbalance is found in these
cultural or economic contexts, it is not irrational for the tribunal to be-
lieve that racial discrimination is a likely explanation for the imbalance.
c. Racial statistics to define performance goals. The first two uses
of racial statistics-to trigger investigation and to establish a prima
facie case-focus on the actual racial composition of the work force.
Concededly, the enforcement agency's concern with the actual racial
composition of the employer's work force may induce the employer to
establish, on his own, goals that he will seek to attain. One obvious way
to minimize the risk of becoming the object of an investigation or to
avoid being required to disprove discrimination is to hire a sufficient
number of Negroes so that the work force is not unbalanced. But in
the third general use of racial statistics--to define a performance goal-
the relation between the racial statistics and the employer's conduct is
more direct and more explicit. A goal is defined in terms of having a
certain percentage of blacks in the employer's work force; and the en-
forcement agency announces that if the employer's performance deviates
from this goal, he will be "punished," unless he can adequately explain
the deviation. If the performance goal were embodied in a court decree,
the punishment would be a contempt citation or, if the goal were set
under the Executive Order,48 the punishment would be cancellation of
contracts with the government.
This use of racial statistics preserves the distinction between con-
sequence and cause. Noncompliance with the specified goal will not
itself be deemed discrimination but merely the result or consequence
of discrimination. That is why the employer has an opportunity
to show that the deviation from the goal was not the result of dis-
crimina.tion. However, the distinction between cause and conse-
47 The statement of Judge Rives in United States ex rel. Goldsby v. Harpole, 263 F.2d
71, 82 (5th Cir. 1959), is the classic one, not because judges will not take these factors
into consideration but because few will explicitly acknowledge that they do. He said:
"As Judges of a Circuit comprising six states of the deep South, we think that it is
our duty to take judicial notice that lawyers residing in many southern jurisdictions
rarely, almost to the point of never, raise the issue of systematic exclusion of Negroes
from juries."
48 Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C1.R. 167 (1965), as amended Exec. Order No. 11,375,
3 C.F.R. 320 (1967), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Supp. III, 1965-67). see generally Note, Executive
Order 11246: Anti-discrimination Obligations in Government Contracts, 44 N.Y.U.L Rav.
590 (1969).
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quence becomes extraordinarily formal, perhaps more so than when
racial statistics are used as a trigger to investigate or as a basis for real-
locating the burden of proof. This is due to the cumulative impact of
four features of a performance goal. First, the burden is on the employer
to show that the deviation from the goal was not the result of dis-
crimination. The allocation of the burden is inherent in the announce-
ment of the performance goal and does not depend on the satisfaction of
any additional conditions. Second, the agency orders or directs that the
employer work toward achieving "the consequence," making the
achievement of the consequence-the goal-appear to be the obligation
under the law. Third, the risk of being "punished" is imminent, increas-
ing the incentive to forget the ultimate obligation and, instead, merely
to conform to the performance goal. The ingenious and understanding
tribunal may find ways to give the employer who does not discharge the
burden "another chance;" for example, the obligation to conform to
the performance goal may be understood as an obligation to make "a
good-faith effort" to conform to the performance goal and the court may
be satisfied that the noncomplying employer has made a good-faith ef-
fort. But the employer under such a performance goal should not count
on that second chance, and he is not likely to. Fourth, the threat is that
if the employer fails to discharge this burden, he will be "punished,"
not merely put under an injunction couched in general terms.
In order to preserve the distinction between cause and consequence,
additional safeguards are necessary. Use of racial statistics to set per-
formance goals should be reserved for the exceptional case where certain
conditions are satisfied: (1) There should be a high degree of confidence
that the employer has discriminated. This degree of confidence is likely
to be satisfied only after an admission or a thorough adjudicatory process,
resulting in a particularized and almost unquestioned finding of dis-
crimination. (2) There is little prospect of eliminating racial discrimina-
tion through the ordinary remedial processes, that is, by merely restating
in an order the general prohibition against discrimination or by requir-
ing the employer to make changes in his employment procedures that
might bring discrimination to an end. (8) There should be an evi-
dentiary hearing on the specific terms of the performance goal, that is,
on the percentage of blacks that must be attained under it.49
49 In the employment context, the most prominent initial uses of performance goals
occurred in the building trades industry. In Insulators & Asbestos Workers Local 53 v.
Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969), the district court found blatant discriminatory
practices and imposed a performance goal in the form of alternating black/white re-
ferrals. This solution would eliminate the risk of those operating the hiring hall cir-
cumventing any decree that merely ordered the unions to "stop discriminating"; but it is
not clear why the risk of abuse could not be curbed by an order establishing priority
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With all three uses of racial statistics-as a trigger to an investigation,
as a basis for allocating the burden of proof, and for defining per-
for referrals on the basis of time, with a requirement of record-keeping. In any event,
the significance of this innovation may be minimized by the fact that the goal was
imposed as part of a preliminary injunction (to expire on the formulation of objective
referral standards) and that, at the time the district court imposed the injunction, demand
for referrals was very high. Another use of performance goals occurred with the Phil-
adelphia Plan. That plan, which was to apply to federal construction projects or federally
assisted construction of $500,000 or more, required the contractors to commit themselves
in their bids to certain minority representation in the work force on the job. The Plan
also specified the following range of minority group representation as being acceptable:
Ironworkers 1st yr. 5%-97
2nd yr. 11%-15%
3rd yr. 16%-20%
4th yr. 22%-26%
Plumbers and Pipefitters 1st yr. 5%-S%
2nd yr. 10%-14%
3rd yr. 15%-19%
4th yr. 20%-24%
Steamfitters Ist yr. 5%-87
2nd yr. 11%-15%
3rd yr. 15%-19%
4th yr. 20%-24%
Sheetmetal Workers, 1st yr. 4%-8%
Electrical Workers, and 2nd yr. 9%-13%
Elevator Construction Workers 3rd yr. 14%-18%
4th yr. 19%-23%
The legality of this plan has been sustained by the district court in Contractors Ass'n v.
Schultz, 62 CCH Lab. Gas. 9421 (E.D. Pa. 1970), and arguably also by Congress when in
December, 1969, it refused to enact a rider to an appropriation bill that was intended to
support the Comptroller General's view that the Plan was inconsistent with Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Jones, The Bugaboo of Employment Quotas, 1970 WIs.
L. Rav. 341; Leiken, Preferential Treatment in the Skilled Building Trades: An Analysis
of the Philadelphia Plan, 56 CoRNaLL L. Rav. 84 (1970); Hearings on the Philadelphia
Plan and S. 931 Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (October 22-28, 1969) [hereinafter cited as Senate
Hearings on the Philadelphia Plan]. I do not believe that there is anything unlawful about
the use of performance goals per se, but the three aspects of the use made of them in the
Philadelphia Plan seem problematic: (1) The Plan was not preceded by a formal
adjudicatory process to determine whether the unions discriminated but by only a wide-
ranging nonadversary hearing. Of course, the absence of such a hearing may be
predicated on the presence of widespread beliefs as to longstanding, flagrant discriminatory
practices in the building trades unions. See p. 251 supra. (2) The performance goals are
addressed to the contractors, not the unions. That limitation may be simply a function
of the limitation of the terms of the Executive Order. Or it may be an attempt to get the
contractors to police the unions or to force them to develop alternative sources of workers.
But this strategy might rest on unrealistic assumptions about the allocation of power in
the building trades industry. (3) The opportunity afforded the contractors to explain that
the deviation is not due to racial discrimination-by either themselves or their unions-
is limited. The employer is given such an opportunity in proceedings to cancel existing
contracts and bar future contracting; but the Philadelphia Plan requires that before the
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formance goals-the central problem does not stem from the conscious-
ness of color or, more particularly, from the fact that enforcement
agencies are concerned with the number of blacks in the employer's
work force. After all, blacks, not whites, were to be the primary bene-
ficiaries of the prohibition against racial discrimination; and blacks, not
whites, are the likely victims of racial discrimination. Instead, the cen-
tral problem is the more mundane one of setting an accurate statistical
norm, that is, in determining what proportion of blacks would be
in the employer's work force in the absence of racial discrimination.
All three uses of racial statistics incorporate some view as to the proper
statistical norm. Racial imbalance expresses that view negatively-it is
a deviation from this norm. Performance goals express the view af-
firmatively-you must reach this norm.
In some areas covered by an antidiscrimination prohibition, such as
juries and voting, it is relatively easy to construct the statistical norm.
It is a function of certain demographic data, namely, the percentage of
Negroes of a certain age in the total population of that age in the com-
munity. Thus, in voting, for example, the statistical norm could be con-
structed from the voting-age population; and even if there were literacy
tests, a fairly simple index, such as completion of the sixth grade of
school, could be used to delineate the relevant racial populations. And
such information is easily available in public documents, such as census
reports."" However, in the employment area it is more difficult to con-
struct the statistical norm for a particular employer.
award of a particular contract, the employer must commit himself to these performance
goals. The employer must make the commitment at the time of the bid, and the com-
mitment is evaluated-the bids are opened-before the awarding of the contract. The
contractor may be able to litigate the question of his ineligibility if he cannot, in good
conscience, commit himself to these goals at the time of bidding; but the particular con-
tract is likely to be awarded long before that question is ultimately resolved. The business-
man interested in wealth maximization is likely to commit himself to these goals and then
find a way-some way-to come close to his commitment. For another use of performance
goals see the Department of Justice March 1970 agreement with the motion picture and
television industries in Los Angeles, described in note 28 supra, which provides for
permanent craft jobs a 20% ratio of minority to white members. See also United States v.
Ironworkers Local 86, 315 F. Supp. 1202 (W.D. Wash. 1970).
50 See, e.g., Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, providing in suits by the Attorney Gen-
eral a presumption of literacy based on a sixth-grade education, 42 U.S.C. § 1971(c) (Supp. II,
1965). In the cases involving assignment of faculty and students among public schools, see
note 37 supra, the statistical norm was constructed from the racial distribution in the system
as a whole; the goal provided that distribution should be mirrored in each school and
grade. The theory was that, without past discriminatory practices, the races would be so
distributed. This, like the judgment as to the statistical norm in employment, seems
problematic; but in this context there were two factors to moderate the concern. One
is the value attached to integration in public education, see note 42 supra. The second
is the absence of competitive unfairness; all the teachers and students were in some
school, although their preferences as to which school they were assigned to may have
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In the employment area, demographic data are no more than an
informative starting point. (a) The appropriate geographic area of the
labor market must also be delineated. People travel to work and the
boundaries of political entities usually do not delineate the labor
market. These differences are important; for example, if the city is
taken as the relevant market, there may be a much higher percentage of
blacks than if the entire metropolitan area, including the suburbs, is
taken to be the relevant market. (b) An assessment must be made of the
skill and ability requirements for the job or promotion, and these vary
depending on how much on-the-job training the employer is willing to
permit. Moreover, there must be a determination of the relative dis-
tribution of these skills and abilities among racial groups. Historical
legacies preclude, at least in the near future, the assumption of equal
distribution of skills and abilities among racial classes. (c) There also
must be a determination of the attractiveness of the job to the relevant
racial populations. The attractiveness of a job is, of course, a function
of many factors, such as the salary level, regularity of work, fringe bene-
fits, chances for promotion, the pleasantness of the type of work, and
geographic accessibility to the job. (d) There must be also a determina-
tion of alternative job opportunities and an assessment of the attractive-
ness of these alternatives in comparison with the jobs offered by the
employer in question. The determination of alternative job opportuni-
ties must take due account of the prevalence of discrimination elsewhere
in the labor market. The level of discrimination would affect the
number of alternative opportunities open to blacks with the requisite
skills and abilities, which in turn would affect the statistical norm for
this particular employer. And that level, of course, varies with the in-
tensity and effectiveness of enforcement actions. (e) Finally, if the
question is whether an employer discriminated after a certain date, as
is often the case with a newly enacted fair employment law or one with
a statute of limitations, it is necessary to take account of the vacancy
rate of the employer's work force.
These difficult assessments do not render impossible the task of devis-
ing a statistical norm. And there may be ways of accommodating the
chance of error. For example, only "substantial" or "gross" imbalance
may be used as a trigger for an investigation or a basis for reallocating
the burden of proof. Or the enforcement agency may insist upon a
"good-faith effort" to comply with the established performance goals
and assure the employer that the goals are "flexible."51 The risk of in-
been frustrated. The issue was not one of hiring teachers or deciding which students
should get an education (e.g., college admission)-the true analogs to the employment
context.
51 See Senate Hearings on the Philadelphia Plan at 123-39.
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accuracies may also be accommodated by carefully preserving an op-
portunity for the employer to explain his departure from the statistical
norm. However, even with these devices the risk of a mistake in setting
the statistical norm persists and, in my judgment, remains quite high.
This does not preclude the use of racial statistics. There is no inherent
reason why law enforcement agencies should avoid all risks. It would
be rational for the legal system to permit even high-risk ventures if the
costs of mistakes are small and the promise of benefits significant.
What, then, are the costs of a mistake? First, a mistake in setting the
statistical norm, whether it be too high or too low, may impair the in-
tegrity and thus the credibility of the fact-finding process of the law.
This may be of little concern when only the commencement of an in-
vestigation is at stake, for it is permissible for investigators to rely on
"hunches" and "suspicions'--views of the facts that admittedly might
be wrong. But mistakes are of more concern when the statistical norms
are injected into the formalized adjudicatory process. The moral
authority or integrity of the tribunals involved in that process, for the
litigants and the community at large, in part depends on the accuracy
of its factual findings.
A second group of costs may arise where the statistical norm is too
low. A level that is too low might let too many discriminators through
the investigatory net; it may leave an impossible burden of proof on the
plaintiff; and it may result in "tokenism." By hiring a few Negroes, as
directly required under the performance goal or indirectly encouraged
by the agency's use of racial imbalance, the employer may be able to
insulate himself from further investigation or challenge even though he
may continue to discriminate. Of course, the seriousness of the "token-
ism" risk depends on one's view of the ease with which racial discrimina-
tion can be detected or established without relying on statistical enforce-
ment techniques. Or it may depend on how seriously the employer
would otherwise take his obligation under the law. A slight increase in
the level of compliance-"tokenism"--may be better than nothing. And
it is difficult to be concerned about a possible decrease in the employer's
attentiveness to his obligation under the law when, in the absence of
racial statistics, he would not be attentive at all.
A third set of costs may arise if the statistical norm errs on the high
side. One cost is the expenditure of public resources in investigating
and adjudicating unwarranted claims. This in turn will involve direct
costs for the innocent employer. For example, an investigation initiated
because of deviation from an unrealistically high statistical norm may
cause, especially in the minds of those interviewed, including present
employees and unsuccessful applicants, unwarranted injury to the em-
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ployer's reputation. He may not care about his reputation as a nondis-
criminatory employer but he surely cares about his reputation as one
who obeys the law. The investigation may also cause the employer to
incur certain additional operating costs: labor costs for the time his
employees spend being interviewed, the costs of making the company's
records available, and the expense of consulting an attorney. Similarly,
having to defend by proving that discrimination was not the cause of
the imbalance or having to justify noncompliance with the performance
goals obviously entails significant costs to the innocent employer, again
both financially and in terms of goodwill and reputation. These direct
costs are to some extent inherent in any enforcement activity. But when
this enforcement activity is guided by a statistical norm that is un-
realistically high, these costs to society and the employer increase sig-
nificantly.
The prospect of such increased direct costs may lead the employer to
incur greater anticipatory costs. 5 2 The farsighted and efficient business-
man may, in anticipation of greater direct costs, be willing to pay a
higher price than he otherwise would for insurance. For example,
greater direct costs increase the incentive to institute an elaborate and
formal procedure for making employment decisions. There is also an
incentive to insure through racial hiring. The incentive to purchase
this form of insurance is particularly great because it is more responsive
than an objective selection system to the particular enforcement tech-
nique in question, namely, using racial statistics. Moreover, if the
statistical norm is too high and the employer is pressured to conform to
that level, the likely result is that blacks will be hired because of their
color, in violation of the merit principle and in violation of the basic
prohibition of fair employment laws. The increased labor costs would
be the price of the insurance, which might well be below the direct costs
of possible enforcement action, even if those costs are discounted by the
unlikelihood of it occurring. Racial hiring makes economic sense, partic-
ularly when the statistical norm is used to define a performance goal. In
that instance, the discount is small because the threatened enforcement
action is already particularized and imminent, and because there is a
threat made to the individual employer in question that unexplained
noncompliance will result in "punishment," not merely in a generally
worded decree requiring compliance with the law.
The costs to the public enforcement agencies and businessmen of
setting the statistical norm too high cannot be dismissed lightly. There
may be a waste of economic resources, and that is likely to have its effect
on the public, including blacks, as consumers. Perhaps of even greater
52 See p. 256 supra.
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concern is the irony that, in attempting to enforce fair employment laws
through the use of racial statistics, the enforcement agency may set the
statistical norm too high and thereby increase the incentives for the
employer to violate the law-to hire blacks because of their color. When
a Negro is chosen by an employer because of his color solely to meet a
statistical norm, which is extremely likely when the statistical norm
errs on the high side, a white is being denied the opportunity or is being
discriminated against because of his color.
Notwithstanding these costs, there are three factors that might
justifiably moderate one's concern with the risk of erring on the high
side in setting the statistical norm. One is a judgment that even though
the statistical norm is set too high, there remains an incentive on the
part of the employer to base his decisions on merit. The benefits from
increased productivity through merit hiring might offset whatever
costs might be involved in answering or responding to charges of dis-
crimination. These benefits might not neutralize the incentive to use
racial hiring to create the appearance of compliance, but they place
some ceiling on the incentive.
Second, assuming a heavy white majority in the relevant constituency,
political pressures are likely to lessen the risk that the statistical norm
will err on the high side. Although enforcement agencies are not as
responsive to political majorities as are legislative bodies, they are not
entirely autonomous. There is always the possibility that the majority
will change or amend the law. Courts rely in large part on the con-
fidence of the community-the whole community-for their authority;
administrators have similar needs. Indeed, administrators are partic-
ularly vulnerable to political pressures through the appropriation
process. As long as the political majority remains white on the national
or state level and the affected employers can bring their claims to the
political forum, there is little likelihood that the statistical norm will
consistently be set too high.
A commitment to the redistributive goal is the third factor moderat-
ing the concern with the chance of the statistical norm erring on the
high side. An error of this type would be more tolerable if the aim of
the law were thought to be equal achievement-increasing the slice of
the economic pie for Negroes. The chosen strategy of the legal system-
that of prohibiting racial discrimination-acknowledges limits to the
majority's willingness to pursue the redistributive goal. But these
statistical enforcement techniques may fall within those limits. Only the
possibility as opposed to the certainty of unfair treatment or violation
of the law is created by the error. As we have seen, the very existence of a
fair employment law may provide incentives to engage in racial hiring
[VoI. 58:235
Fair Employment Laws
as a form of insurance against enforcement; and a statistical norm that
is too high merely increases those incentives. Moreover, the conduct that
increases the incentives to engage in racial hiring is undertaken in ef-
forts to enforce that prohibition effectively and efficiently. The agency
may be misenforcing, but presumably only inadvertently.
The difficulties inherent in determining the proper statistical norm
and an awareness of the costs of an error compel caution, but not the
conclusion that all such uses of racial statistics are impermissible. These
uses of the racial statistics promise certain efficiencies in the law enforce-
ment process that might well offset the decrease in overall productivity
stemming from the costs of mistakes to society. More importantly, it
should be understood that the realistic alternative to enforcement tech-
niques employing racial statistics is underenforcement. I have confined
the uses of such statistics to situations where other techniques for effec-
tive law enforcement are not available. To forbid the use of racial
statistics even in these situations would severely limit the prospect of
effective enforcement of the fair employment laws. This would mean a
continued preference of whites because of their color--certainly as
much a violation of the law as preference for blacks because of their
color. The question should not be one of ever permitting the use of
racial statistics for enforcement purposes but, rather, whether in each
case the appropriate conditions are satisfied and whether the statistical
norm is accurate.
B. The Employer's Obligation Under the Law: The Evolution of
Doctrine Rendering It Sometimes Necessary and Permissible for
the Employer to Consider Race
The use of race by the enforcement agencies may create incentives,
often powerful ones, for the employer to prefer blacks in his employ-
ment decisions. Beyond that, the employer's obligation under the law
has, in some situations, been construed to permit and indeed require
the employer to consider race and to engage in conduct that confers
benefits on a class that is predominantly, if not exclusively, black. This
conferral of benefits is claimed to be a form of preferential treatment
of blacks. The appropriate response is not to resurrect the concept of
color blindness but to determine whether this conferral of benefits
constitutes a preferential, rather than equal, treatment and whether
it is based on race or some other factor.
1. Conduct Not Involving a Choice Among Competing Individuals.
A fair employment law is a device for regulating employment decisions,
and, as we have seen, an employment decision is analyzed primarily as
a choice among several individuals competing for a limited number of
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opportunities. The competitive paradigm emphasizes the judgmental
quality of an employment decision-picking the best individual. It ex-
plains the sense of unfairness when a decision is based on an arbitrary
criterion. It also emphasizes the two-dimensional quality of all benefit-
giving activity: to give the job to one person is to deny it to another.
But this paradigm might be too limited. The employer can engage in
conduct that greatly affects his employment decisions but that itself
does not involve a choice among competing individuals in the sense that
awarding a job does. The most familiar example is the distribution of
information concerning job openings. There is considerable doctrine
that construes the antidiscrimination prohibition to permit, and some-
times even to require, employers to engage in informational programs
addressed or tailored to blacks. Often the government conducts or sub-
sidizes such programs.
The initial question to be asked concerns permissibility: Can such
informational programs be reconciled with the antidiscrimination
prohibition? An affirmative answer depends on two propositions: (a)
the conferral of benefits on the class is not based on race but on the
special informational needs of the black community; and (b) the benefit
conferred is a limited one-not awarding a job, but merely giving in-
formation that is generally available to other groups and that is arguably
not available to blacks because of general patterns of discrimination.
A tribunal faced with a challenge to a black recruitment program
may conclude that, even though the benefit (information) is conferred
on a class of persons consisting primarily of blacks, it is not conferred be-
cause of their race but because of their special needs. These needs may
be of two varieties. The first relates to the lack of knowledge of job op-
portunities. The assumption is that the availability of job opportunities
is primarily known by word of mouth, through people who are working
with or known to the employer,53 and that the paid advertisement is
used only when these informal methods are inadequate. Admittedly,
some whites do not have access to word-of-mouth information, but the
assumption is that blacks, as a racial class, are more likely than whites
not to have access to most of this information. This may be a function
of all-white work forces, as well as segregated residential, social and
educational patterns, all of which have the effect of limiting the op-
portunities blacks as a racial class have to come into contact with those
53 See, e.g., Marshall 9- Van Adams, supra note 4, at 314: "'Employee referrals' was
the source most consistently used by employers (83.0 percent of the 52 employers respond-
ing to this question used this source) and most frequently ranked as effective for re-
cruiting white-collar employees (58.1 percent ranked it as effective) . . . . [Fjor
employers, 81.0 percent of those responding used the state employment office, but only
30.9 percent viewed it as effective for recruiting white-collar employees."
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who are likely to know of employment opportunities. Concededly, these
segregated patterns may be attributable to many factors, but the
further assumption is that they are in large part due to discrimina-
tion against blacks. The alleged second special need is invitational:
blacks not only have to be told about the vacancy, but they must also be
invited to apply. The assumption here is that blacks may hesitate to
apply because they fear they will be victims of discriminatory practices.
This fear may be irrational; but, if rooted in past discriminatory prac-
tices of the employer, the industry, or the geographic area, it is likely to
be quite rational. An informational program addressed to the black
community not only gives information otherwise unavailable but also
conveys, implicitly or explicitly, an assurance that the employer will not
discriminate against blacks because of their race.
Although race is not the basis of conferring these benefits, it is often
used as the primary, though perhaps not exclusive, identifying charac-
teristic of the class of persons to whom the information is addressed. In
this sense, the color black is used symptomatically. It indicates the class
of persons likely to have special informational needs, and the symp-
tomatic relationship between race and these needs is no accident. The
needs of blacks are assumed to be caused in large part by discrimination
against the racial class. Of course, there may be some blacks who do not
have these special informational needs. But the empirical assumption
is that, in the generality of cases, it is accurate (and perhaps that the
cost of an error is not high). Nor is there a fatal inconsistency in for-
bidding the symptomatic use of black for imposing disadvantages, such
as denial of jobs, while permitting the symptomatic use of black for
conferring this limited type of benefit-giving information about job
openings that is generally available to other groups. This asymmetry
does not seem paradoxical in light of the limited nature of the benefit
and the aggregate economic goal of the law, that is, improving the
relative economic position of Negroes. Perhaps the asymmetry can be
explained also in terms of the unverified empirical proposition that race
is a more accurate symptom of "having special informational needs"
than it is of "low productivity."
Though the identifying criterion is race, often, but not always, it is
camouflaged. For example, the addressees may be described in terms of
residence ("the inner-city residents"), or attendance at certain high
schools ("the ghetto schools"), or membership in certain organizations
("community action organizations"), or economic status ("the hardcore
unemployed"). These choices of nonracial labels reflect a desire to avoid
even the appearance of a conflict between the program and the anti-
discrimination prohibition. Yet the legality of these programs has not,
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and should not, turn on the choice of label. The employer or public
agency that acknowledges the racial contours of the benefited class is
not only franker but it is likely to be more efficient.
Presumably, it would not be permissible to design a similar informa-
tional program addressed to whites. And to that extent the normative
equivalence of the colors white and black breaks down. This asymmetry
can be explained on the theory that a class identifiable primarily by
the color white does not have the same informational needs as does a
class identifiable primarily by the color black. Of course, there may be
other minority groups in our society that have these special needs, for
example, Mexican-Americans, Puerto Ricans, Appalachians, or the
rural poor. But instituting an informational program addressed to
blacks does not preclude the employer or the government from extend-
ing the program to groups with similar needs; nor does the law condi-
tion its willingness to permit special informational programs for blacks
on the willingness of the employer or government to undertake similar
programs for all minorities. In this regard, it is possible to move step by
step.
The permissibility of a black-recruitment program turns not only
on the alleged existence of these special informational needs and the
symptomatic relationship between the color black and these needs, but
also on the limited nature of the benefit conferred. Undoubtedly there
is a benefit conferred. The information is more than the recipients might
otherwise receive; and it helps them to obtain employment opportunities.
Moreover, because scarce resources are consumed by the informational
program, a benefit is conferred on one group that is not conferred on
another. But the benefit is limited in two senses. First, the information is
of a very general nature. The assumption is that the information distrib-
uted would be available to a significant number of blacks (the class
benefited) if there were no discrimination in society, and it is the kind of
information that others have. For example, the informational program
could advise that there are openings in the apprenticeship program of a
building trades union and announce the procedures for applying. This
information is, in a sense, public-although not every member of the
public may have it. It is not suggested that the informational program
would be consistent with the antidiscrimination prohibition if it gave
information not generally available, such as the answers to a test or an
early announcement of the time for applying for positions awarded on
the basis of the time of application. Second, the benefit is limited be-
cause only information, and not a job, is being given. The redistributive
54 See, e.g., McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 894 US. 802 (1969); Katzenbach
v. Morgan, 884 U.S. 641 (1966).
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quality of this benefit-conferring activity is not pronounced. True,
an increase in the number of blacks hired may be one consequence of
the information program, and that may well be one of the underlying
aims of the program. Indeed, an actual increase in the number of blacks
hired is one of the most effective ways of recruiting black applicants and
almost a necessary condition of an effective recruitment program. It
lends credibility to the implicit message in any informational program,
namely, that hiring is on a nondiscriminatory basis. Yet the information
program can be separated from one of its possible consequences. The
racial composition of the universe of applicants might change and that
might lead to an increase in the number of black employees. But it need
not, and the assumption 55 is that the assembled universe will be treated
in accordance with the antidiscrimination prohibition and that, if there
is an increase in the number of black employees, it will not be due to
hiring on the basis of race. The unfairness to a white inherent in re-
jecting him for a job on the basis of his color is not necessarily present;
this lessens the burden that must be shouldered by those who argue for
special informational programs for blacks and the stricture against
preferential treatment based on race is thereby left intact.
In addition to the question of permissibility, there is also the duty
question: Does the antidiscrimination prohibition oblige employers to
engage in a special informational program? In approaching this ques-
tion, its practical significance should be kept in perspective. It should
be recognized that the businessman has several incentives to institute
"voluntarily" such an informational program. First, information dis-
tributed to the black community may be a relatively inexpensive way
of increasing his supply of labor and thereby cutting his labor costs. The
assumption need not be that blacks are more productive, but rather that
they constitute a ready reservoir of workers who are likely to be willing
to work at low wages and, further, that the traditional informational
mechanisms have not been adequate to reach this supply of labor.
Second, just as some businessmen may be willing to make monetary
sacrifices to satisfy a taste for discrimination, others may be willing
to make a similar trade-off to satisfy a taste for responding to the
special needs of the black community. This may increase their happiness
directly, or indirectly by pleasing their friends, relatives or peer
groups. Third, the employer may incur the costs of these programs
in anticipation of enforcement action. Faced with actual or likely
55 Contrast Professor Blumrosen's proposal for a so-called "affirmative action file,"
supra note 7, at 488: "This contemplates a recruitment procedure whereby the employer
seeks applications from minorities, reviews them, and places the presumptively qualified
minority group applications in a separate file. He reviews this file first when vacancies
arise and will hire from it unless he has compelling reasons not to."
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charges of discrimination, the businessman interested in wealth maxi-
mization may institute an informational program to reduce the risk
of enforcement action. It serves an insurance function like the ob-
jective decision system or the racial hiring program; the direct costs
of an enforcement action (even discounted by its unlikelihood) are
greater than the price of the insurance. In many respects this insurance
policy is somewhat more attractive than the others. Unlike an objective
.decision system, the publicity value of these programs is high. In con-
trast to racial hiring, this type of activity is acceptable to competing
whites because they realize that the benefit to blacks is a limited one-
receiving the information does not guarantee receiving the job. This
form of insurance does not involve the same kind of individual unfair-
ness as racial hiring. And the economic price of the insurance is low; it
consists of the cost of transmitting the information (sending an an-
nouncement to an organization, or purchasing advertisements in news
media, or having a representative of the company make public ap-
pearances), and the cost of processing an increased number of applica-
tions. Indeed, in many instances, the price of the insurance to the em-
ployer may be subsidized by the government (through "outreach"
grants).56 Moreover, even if these incentives are not sufficient to lead
businessmen to adopt voluntarily such informational programs, the
willingness of the government to maintain its own programs (such as
the Apprenticeship Information Center) and the incentives and oppor-
tunities for the black community to establish programs for distributing
job information (such as that of the Urban League) lead me to believe
56 These factors probably account for the popularity of these outreach programs with
the building trades unions. See, e.g., Statement of Louis Sherman, General Counsel, Build-
ing and Construction Trades Department, AFL-CIO:
Our opposition to the amended revised Philadelphia plan of September 23,
1969, should be viewed in proper perspective. The Building and Construction
Trades Department at its 55th convention (September 22, 1969) adopted a com-
prehensive statement of policy on equal employment opportunity. The fol-
lowing excerpts from this statement of policy show the favorable attitude of the
building and construction trades to the equal opportunity program and some of
the achievements of the trades in this regard:
"The Building and Construction Trades Department and its affiliates have not
contented themselves with so-called passive non-discrimination programs. Whether
or not legally required, the Department and its affiliates have undertaken affirina-
tive action to increase Negro employment in the building and construction trades.
At its 1967 Convention, the Building and Construction Trades Department
adopted a resolution stating that it 'endorses generally the principle of affirmative
action to assist Negroes and other minority group persons in finding suitable
employment and improving their economic and social status.' In a later com-
munication from the President of the Department to the Secretary of Labor, the
Department proposed to implement the resolution, among other things, by
fostering 'with the cooperation of appropriate management organizations pro-
grams of recruitment of qualified applicants for apprenticeship from the Negro
population and other minority groups."'
Senate Hearings on the Philadelphia Plan at 163.
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that the duty question is not nearly as significant as the permissibility
question.57
In approaching the duty question, it should be understood also that
the question might arise in two quite distinct contexts. In one, the
question arises incident to formulating a comprehensive decree against
an employer, and in the other the duty question is the sole question of
discrimination. In the first context, there is a finding that the employer
has discriminated on the basis of race in his employment decisions, and
the problem is one of determining the terms and scope of the decree.
From this perspective it seems fair to require the employer to institute
a special informational program. Indeed, for the reasons already sug-
gested, the employer is most likely to consent to this facet of the decree.
To the extent that the employer has excluded blacks from his work
force he has blocked one source of knowledge for the black community
about job openings, and it is more rational for blacks to feel that they
are not welcome. There is a need for an invitation. Moreover, the
financial costs of the special informational program are likely to be
viewed from a compensatory perspective-the sacrifice in wealth due to
the additional expense of the program is appropriate since the em-
ployer's wrongdoing gave rise to the special informational needs.
This judicial practice is fairly typical 8 and thus represents a depar-
ture from the norm of color blindness. However, the willingness of
tribunals to answer the duty question affirmatively in this limited con-
text should not be mistaken for the emergence of a general duty to
respond to the special informational needs of the black community. It
is a well-established principle that a decree may hold a defendant who
has violated a legal prohibition to a higher standard of conduct than
that required by the prohibition itself. The decree should not only
prevent discriminatory employment decisions from occurring but also
eradicate the effects of those decisions.59 The fact that a decree requires
an employer to engage in certain conduct does not necessarily mean
57 See generally F.R. MARSHALL & V. BRIGGS, THE NEGRO AND APPRENTICESHIP (1967);
Marshall & Van Adams, supra note 4, at 317-18, 321-22; Pinkus, The Workers Defense
League, in PROGRAMS TO EMPLOY THE DISADVANTAGED (P. Doeringer ed. 1969).
58 See, e.g., United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 36, 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969);
United States v. Iron Workers Local 392, 3 CCH Empl. Prac. Dec. 8063 (E.D. Ill. 1970)
(consent decree); United States v. Plumbers & Pipefitters Local 173, 314 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.
Ind. 1969); United States v. Operating Eng'rs Local 520, CCH EMPL. PRAc. GumE 8115
(E.D. Ill. 1969).
59 See, e.g., Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965); United States v. E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316 (1961); United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 (1947);
Porter v. Warner Co., 328 U.S. 395 (1946); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941);
Warner & Co. v. Lilly & Co., 265 U.S. 526 (1924); United States v. Alabama, 304 F.2d 583
(5th Cir.), affd per curiam, 371 U.S. 37 (1962).
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that the prohibition of its own force legally obligates the employer to
engage in that conduct.
From this perspective, where there is no finding of actual discrimina-
tion in the employer's decision, I do not understand the antidiscrimina-
tion prohibition to oblige employers to respond to the special
informational needs of the black community and much less to produce
an integrated universe of job applicants. The general legal duty is for
the employer not to discriminate on the basis of race. In the recruitment
context, this means that race must not be the basis for determining the
addressees of a program distributing information about jobs. This rule
is applicable even if the employer believes that the color white is
symptomatic of greater productivity or even if the recruitment of whites
would be conducive to economies because it satisfies the discriminatory
desires of workers or customers. 60 When the plaintiff can prove that an
employer's informational program is not based on costs but on race (or,
with a shift of the burden, the defendant is unable to prove that the
program is based on costs), then a remedial order could appropriately
require the employer to adopt recruitment practices to neutralize the
effects of previous practices and minimize the risk of future discrimina-
tion in recruitment. A special informational program would serve both
purposes.
The troublesome case is where the recruitment program is based on
costs, rather than on the race of the addressees, and yet (a) the persons
most likely to receive the information are white and (b) that is fore-
seeable by the employer. This might occur when the optimum ad-
vertising (that reaching the most people at the lowest price) for workers
is that placed in newspapers not generally read by the black community.
Or, as is more common, the employer might rely exclusively on walk-ins
or word-of-mouth recruitment by present workers. The addressees of
word-of-mouth recruitment will be white only if most of the present
workers are white; but it is important to emphasize that the context
we are now discussing is one in which it has not been established that
the racial homogeneity of the work force is due to exclusion of Negroes
based on their race.
An argument might be constructed to bring this troublesome case
within the reach of fair employment laws. One such argument would
build on the situation where (a) the program was cost-justified but (b)
the result (reach only whites) was predictable and (c) the employer
desired that result because he wanted to exclude blacks from his work
force (in order to satisfy his taste for discrimination or that of his
workers or customers). The argument would be that the "true basis" of
60 See pp. 257-63 supra.
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the program was race rather than cost. A second argument might simply
maintain that it is too difficult for the law to determine whether this
predictable or foreseeable result-a universe of white addressees-is
based on costs, as opposed to the race of the addressees. Rather than
engage in such difficult inquiries, the argument continues, the law
should be construed to require informational programs that would,
without prohibitive expense, include black addressees and tend to
improve the economic position of Negroes-one of the purposes of fair
employment laws.61
Neither argument is particularly persuasive. The second argument
fails simply because the recruitment practices most in controversy, such
as personal referrals or walk-ins, seem on their face to be most economi-
cal. That is no doubt why they are so common. Hence it would be some-
what disingenuous to place much weight on the assertion that it is
difficult to determine whether a recruitment practice is cost-justified.
Moreover, the argument predicated on the situation where the program
is cost-justified and yet the result coincides with the discriminatory
desire of the employer is not decisive; it may be argued with equal force
that the "true basis" is the cost-justification (for he would not incur any
additional costs to satisfy his desire). And it should be recognized that a
decree prohibiting the employer from engaging in such a cost-justified
practice would, by definition, impose inefficiencies on him and thus
transgress one of the limitations generally recognized by fair employ-
ment laws.
In such a situation it seems appropriate to reflect on the value to the
legal system or society of adopting such an argument. Quite frankly, I
see little gain. Since, by and large, the market will insure that the em-
ployer will choose the cost-justified form of recruitment, it is
unlikely that the announcement of a general duty to respond to the
informational needs of blacks will itself radically alter the nature and
terms of recruitment practices and induce employers to adopt volun-
tarily such programs. The self-interest of the employer and the forces of
the market will lead him to choose the cost-justified form of recruit-
ment, regardless of whether it will produce an integrated pool of
applicants. The regulatory power of self-interest and the market may
also lessen the need to impose a duty. The very existence of a fair
employment law is testimony to the fact that the regulatory power of
the market is not fully adequate, but this is not to deny the regulatory
61 See generally Blumrosen, supra note 7, at 474-79. "Thus the mechanisms by which
the flow of job applicants is all white may vary, but the result of these mechanisms is the
same. The all-white character of the labor force is perpetuated to the knowledge of the
employer. The system violates title VII.' Id. at 479.
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power of the market altogether, Perhaps the market can be trusted to
take care of the narrow situation where the tribunal has difficulty in
determining that a recruitment program is based on costs rather than
the race of the addressees. Moreover, there are strong incentives for
the employer to institute voluntarily a special informational program,
and there seems little need for additional incentive in the form of a
judicial command. Finally, the opportunities in this area for self-help
are considerable. Any black organization can amplify the addressees of
recruitment programs by making the information available to blacks.
The expense of doing that is minimal, and there are a significant
number of government programs willing to subsidize that form of
self-help. If the concern is with furthering the relative economic posi-
tion of blacks, then the pressure could and should be maintained at the
point where there is little opportunity for self-help--the employment
decision. An attack upon the recruitment practices of an employer may
be considerably easier than an attack upon employment decisions them-
selves; it is easier to detect whether the recruitment reaches an inte-
grated audience than whether the employer chooses applicants on the
basis of race. But it seems that the perfection of enforcement techniques,
and not the announcement of a general duty of integrated recruitment,
is the only appropriate and effective response to that problem.
I would therefore venture to guess that the duty question of recruit-
ment, abstracted from the context of formulating a more comprehensive
decree dealing with discriminatory employment decisions, will be
thrust upon tribunals in rather artificial situations. It may be made the
sole issue of a lawsuit brought by the subsidized lawyer who receives
part of his compensation in terms of the satisfaction he derives from
being thought responsible for "novel" or "far-reaching" doctrine. Or it
may be the position of a litigator who is unable to prove that the em-
ployer discriminates on the basis of race in his choice among applicants.
Or it may be raised because the black organizations and the employer
are conducting an "ideological" battle on the issue of how "responsive"
the employer must be to the needs of the black community.6 2
2. The Evaluation of Facially Innocent Criteria. The choice among
individuals competing for a particular employment opportunity is often
made on the basis of criteria that are allegedly applied to both Negroes
and whites-facially innocent criteria. For example, applicants for a
62 See In re Allen Bradley, CCH EMPL. PRAc. GUIDE 8065, 8070 (Office of Fed.
Contract Compliance 1968, 1969) (the impermissibility of using walk-ins based on the
affirmative-action part of the Executive Order rather than on the prohibition against dis-
crimination). See pp. 310-13 infra. See also EEOC Decision 68-2-724E, Sept. 9, 1969, 49
EEOC Dec. 6066.
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job may be judged on the basis of their performance on a written test.
Graduation from high school or the absence of an arrest record may be
required of all new employees. There may be a requirement that
present members of the work force vouch for the applicant's skill and
reliability or that the applicant be related to a present employee or
member of the union. A referral by a building trades union may be
conditioned on the applicant having worked in the industry for a
certain number of years. Or a preference in promotions, layoffs, recalls,
or referrals may be given to those employees with the most seniority. 63
On one level, these criteria seem immune to a challenge based on the
antidiscrimination prohibition because they seem to apply to both
Negroes and whites. However, in enforcing the antidiscrimination
prohibition in other areas, particularly voting," the use of analogous
facially innocent criteria has not been immune to challenge. The courts
have vigorously probed below the surface and have, in some instances,
found that the use of these criteria violated the prohibition. A similar
pattern is emerging in the enforcement of fair employment laws. But I
believe that the pattern in employment will have different contours and
will be less far-reaching than that in voting. The difference will be due,
first, to the predominance of scarcity which has the effect of under-
scoring the competitive relationship among the applicants for jobs and,
second, to the self-regulatory nature of the market place.
a. The universe of persons to which the criterion is applied: cheat-
63 See generally Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 63 CCH Lab. Cas. 9504 (10th
Cir. 1970) (transfer prohibition); United States v. Local 38, IBEW, 428 F.2d 144 (6th Cir.
1970) (work experience); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225 (4th Cir.), cert. granted,
399 U.S. 926 (1970) (high school diploma equivalency tests); Papermakers & Paperworkers
Local 189 v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970) (se-
niority system); United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 36, 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969)
(prior work experience); United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 415 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1969)
(seniority, prior work experience); Insulators & Asbestos Workers Local 53 v. Vogler, 407 F.2d
1047 (5th Cir. 1969) (nepotism, prior work experience); Gregory v. Litton Systems, 316 F. Supp.
401 (C.D. Cal. 1970) (arrest record); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 62 CCH Lab.
Cas. 9448 (W.D.N.Y. 1970) (transfer, seniority); United States v. Plumbers & Pipefitters
Local 73, 61 CCH Lab. Cas. 9329 (S.D. Ind. 1969) (nepotism); United States v. H.K. Porter
Co., 296 F. Supp. 40 (N.D. Ala. 1968) (seniority, tests); Dobbins v. Local 212, IBEW, 292 F.
Supp. 413 (S.D. Ohio 1968) (prior work experience); Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F.
Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968) (seniority); State Comm'n for Human Rights v. Farrell, 43 Misc.
2d 958, 252 N.Y.S.2d 649 (Sup. Ct. 1964) (nepotism, tests).
64 See, e.g., Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969); Louisiana v. United
States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915); Fiss, Gaston County
v. United States: Fruition of the Freezing Principle, supra note 2, at 382. I have also
analyzed the applicability of the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause, whose
language differs from the prototype considered here, to another type of facially innocent
criterion-a geographic criterion-as a basis for assigning students to public schools. Fiss,
Racial Imbalance in the Public Schools: The Constitutional Concepts, supra note 2, at
588.
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ing and implicit exemptions. One source of concern may be the uni-
verse of persons to which the criterion is applied. In spite of its nominal
innocence, a racial class may be exempted by the employer from its
application. The exemption may be created covertly when the employer
"cheats"-he does not fulfill his promise to apply the criterion alike
to both Negro and white. It turns out, on closer inspection, that the
criterion is not applied to whites although it is applied to Negroes, or it
is not applied to whites in the same manner that it is applied to Negroes.
For example, the employer may hire or promote only those Negroes
who pass the test, but hire or promote whites whether or not they pass
the test; or he may score the test of a white more leniently than that of
a black. 65
Such cheating is exceedingly difficult to detect and establish as an
evidentiary matter. The endeavor is hopeless unless performance under
the criterion is quantifiable and unless accurate records are maintained;
and even then some reliance must be placed on enforcement techniques
that involve the use of racial statistics. 66 There are, however, no
departures from the traditional understanding of racial discrimination.
The employer is making some of his employment decisions on the basis
of race. Some Negroes may be treated on the same basis as whites and
obtain jobs; but the ones who are held to a higher standard than whites
are being treated differently because of their race. The remedy is to
prohibit this unequal treatment and to require that whatever criteria
are applied to Negroes are also applied to whites in the same manner.
An exemption of a class of persons may also arise, not from "cheat-
ing" in its crudest sense, but from a change in standards. This results in
an implicit exemption. The employer applies the new standards or
criteria to all new applicants, both white and black, but does not apply
it to those already working for him, and the race of this class is pre-
dominantly, if not exclusively, white.67 This differs from "cheating"
because the employer will admit the exemption and, more importantly,
because the contours of the exempted class differ. In "cheating," the
exempted class is "whites." With the implicit exemption, the exempted
class is "those already hired." This latter class may consist of only
whites but it is not coextensive with or reducible to the class "whites"
65 See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 899 US. 926
(1970); Chambers v. Hendersonville County Ed. of Educ., 364 F.2d 189, 191 (4th Cir. 1966);
EEOC Decision Case Nos. CC AT 7-2-112 (CC-7-2-554) to AT 68-7-99 E, June 30, 1969.
66 See text preceding note 44 supra.
67 See, e.g., Judge Sobeloff's analysis of the high school education requirement in Griggs
v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225, 1247 (4th Cir. 1970). See also Houston Maritime Ass'n v.
NLRB, 168 N.L.R.B. 615 (1967) (freeze on all new applicants).
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because the criterion is applied to newly hired whites as well as to
blacks.
The crux of the conceptual problem is that Negroes are treated in
the same way as some whites but they are also treated differently from
other whites. This raises the question whether the "significant" charac-
teristic of those exempted is their race or the fact that they are already
part of the work force. The Supreme Court faced this question in the
voting context, and it concluded that race was the significant character-
istic of the exempted class when it was established that Negroes had,
because of their race, been excluded in the past from becoming mem-
bers of the class now to be exempted. That was the general thrust of
Guinn v. United States, the classic grandfather-clause case, and more
clearly the result in United States v. Louisiana, where those already
registered to vote were to be exempted from the application of a new
literacy test. s However, the courts are likely to move more cautiously in
the employment context. Otherwise, too high a price would be placed
on change. For example, even if it is established that the employer's
present secretarial staff was not given the rigorous typing test now
given to all new applicants and that, at the time the more lenient test
was used, Negroes were denied jobs as typists because of their race, the
courts are unlikely to condition the giving of the more rigorous typing
test upon the retesting of all workers and the discharge of those who fail
to satisfy it.
What justifies this caution in the employment context? First, the
employer's interest in maximizing his own wealth and the regulatory
power of the market make an employer's change of standard presump-
tively an effort to improve the productivity of his work force, not to
disqualify all new applicants for employment. There is no such pre-
sumption in voting. There the new test was imposed by incumbent
legislators who had everything to gain and little to lose by raising the
qualifications even to the point of disenfranchising all new voters--
white and black. Second, the device used in voting to temper the ban on
change of standards is, realistically speaking, unavailable in employ-
ment. In United States v. Louisiana the Supreme Court said it was
permissible to use the new literacy test if there was a general re-registra-
tion; it merely prohibited its use until there was a general re-registra-
tion, that is, until it was applied to everyone. The Court no doubt knew
that it was unlikely that the State would conduct such a re-registration;
but the option was a real one, and it provided a ready response to the
State's claim that the Court was precluding change. However, the
option seems totally unrealistic in the employment context. The pros-
68 See note 64 supra.
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pect of subjecting all incumbent employees to the new standard at the
risk of discharge has an adverse consequence upon the individual
worker far greater than the risk of losing the right to vote under a
general re-registration. However precious the right to vote is to demo-
cratic theory or for the legitimacy of government, holding a job is likely
to be far more precious to the individual. In addition, from the em-
ployer's perspective the option of retesting makes little sense. Even if
he changes his hiring standards on the view that they are better predic-
tors of productivity than those used before, they are not likely to be
better predictors than the work experience of incumbents. Third, one
of the operative forces in voting was the inherent value of expanding
the franchise-the view that it is a social good to increase the number
of people that are allowed to vote. In employment, there may be a value
in improving the economic status of Negroes, but once scarcity is
acknowledged and the redistributive quality of that goal is perceived,
an element of moderation not present in voting is introduced. Though
the increase in the franchise might have the effect of diluting the votes
of those already franchised, increasing the franchise of blacks does not
take the vote from others.
Hence, though the implied exemption theory was the initial line for
evaluating facially innocent criteria in the voting context, it is likely to
play a lesser role in the employment context. Even if the court deter-
mines that Negroes were excluded (in the past) from the class now to
be exempted from the facially innocent criteria, this should not be the
end of the court's inquiry. A decree is not being sought against the
past exclusion but against the present and seemingly evenhanded use
of the facially innocent standard. Analytically, the issue is not whether
there is past discrimination, or even whether that discrimination is
being perpetuated, but whether the present use of the standard is
discriminatory because of the exemption. That turns on what the court
concludes to be the "significant" characteristic of the class-"race" or
"already hired"-and that conclusion will reflect the outcome of the
court's inquiry into the interests to be served by the changed standard.
Save in the exceptional case, the court would conclude that a class is
exempted, not because of the members' race (white) but because they
are already employed, and thus there is little need for the employer to
apply the new standard to them.
In those instances where the court concludes that the significant
characteristic of the exempted class is race and turns to fashioning the
remedy, there is a possibility that there will be a departure from the
norm of color blindness. A racial distinction may be incorporated into
the correctional scheme if the decree prohibits the application of the
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criterion to a class consisting primarily, if not entirely, of blacks. The
underlying theory of such a remedy is to eliminate or neutralize the
racial aspect of the class "those already hired" by affording those previ-
ously excluded because of their race the opportunity that they were
previously denied-to be judged without regard to race and without
regard to the criterion in question. Under such a remedial order the
employer could apply the criterion to white applicants and some blacks,
that is, those who were not excluded in the past, but for another group
-all black-this criterion could not be applied. This remedy, confer-
ring special benefits on a limited class of blacks, is analytically consistent
with the antidiscrimination prohibition and the stricture against
preferential treatment based on race: the benefits are not conferred on
this class because they are black but, rather, because they are victims
of the discrimination; and although the remedial order would improve
the competitive position of the class, it would not give them a prefer-
ence but put them on equal footing with those with whom they should
be compared-those already hired.
Despite the permissibility of this color-conscious remedy, it is not
likely to be used. Indeed, it was avoided in the most analogous voting
case, United States v. Louisiana. The rejection of this remedy is in part
due to the difficulty of identifying, with any degree of accuracy, the
victims-the class or persons who should be relieved of the new test.
The need for workable criteria-such as race, age, residence-for de-
fining the class of victims and an appreciation of the ripple effect of any
single discriminatory act would lead the court constantly to enlarge the
class to be benefited by the decree beyond the narrow group of blacks
who can establish that they were turned away at the company's door in
the past because of their race. A significant over-inclusion of blacks
would result if the concern were with benefiting the victims of past
discrimination, and that is likely to lead to further over-inclusion-the
dropping of the racial limitation altogether. As in United States v.
Louisiana, the remedial order is likely to omit any racial distinction
and, instead, prohibit the employer from using the new standard to
judge any new applicants-white or black-who meet certain age and
residence requirements. The employer may be able to get out from
under such an order after a limited period of time, that is, after all the
possible victims of past discrimination have had a reasonable time to take
advantage of the court-created exemption; or he may be able to get out
from under it by applying the standard to incumbents as well as new ap-
plicants. It should be emphasized, however, that this color-blind remedy
of prohibiting the application of the new standard to a class of persons
consisting of both whites and blacks exempts more persons from the
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standard than does an order under which all the beneficiaries are black;
the employer himself may decide to exempt incumbent employees, but
now he is ordered to exempt others. This increase in the size of the
class of exempt persons under a color-blind remedy and a concern for
the practical consequences of such an increase may be an additional
factor leading the court to hesitate before finding an implied exemption
for incumbent employees to be a violation of the antidiscrimination pro-
hibition, even though the incumbent class is predominantly or exclu-
sively white and that racial homogeneity is the result of past dis-
criminatory practices.
b. The criterion itself: the theory of functional equivalence.
There may be no issue as to the universe to which the criterion is ap-
plied; there may be a concession that it is applied to everyone in the
same way. The question then is whether the reach of the antidiscrimina-
tion prohibition has been exhausted, and three factors may justify a
second look at the criterion: evasion, unfair treatment, and the impact
of the criterion on the equal-achievement goal.
The first factor-evasion-focuses on the ethical quality of the
employer's conduct. The fear is that an employer will attempt to
satisfy his taste for discrimination, or that of his workers or customers,
by using a criterion which does not mention race but which accom-
plishes precisely the same result, namely, exclusion of Negroes from the
work force. For example, if there is an all-white work force, the em-
ployer may use a nepotism criterion because it will produce the same
result as if he used race.
Second, an attempt to reach the seemingly innocent criterion may be
rooted in a concern for fair treatment of Negroes. It is thought just as
unfair to judge a Negro on the basis of such a criterion as it is to judge
him on the basis of race. This is particularly true with a nonmerit cri-
terion, such as nepotism. Of course, it may be unfair to judge anyone,
white or black, on the basis of such a criterion; but this does not lessen
the unfairness when Negroes are judged by such a criterion, and unfair
treatment of Negroes is viewed as particularly relevant considering the
aims of fair employment laws.
A third source of concern relates to the goal of improving the relative
economic position of blacks. If employers are allowed to apply facially
innocent criteria with impunity, and if the consequence or effect of
using these criteria is to limit the employment opportunities of Negroes
or put them at a competitive disadvantage, the relative economic posi-
tion of Negroes will not be improved. Inequalities in the actual distri-
bution of jobs will persist. This concern assumes that the criterion in
question limits or is likely to limit the employment opportunities of
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Negroes to a greater extent than it does those of whites, and in that
sense will have a differential impact upon the two racial classes.
Regardless of the source of the concern, in each instance there is a
stubborn analytic problem: how can an employment decision based on
the individual's nonperformance under a facially innocent criterion be
deemed to be an-employment decision based on the individual's race?
A desire to evade is not sufficient to establish a violation; it still remains
to be determined that the employer chose his employees on the basis of
race. Moreover, fair employment laws are not general guarantees of
fair treatment to Negroes. Instead, the antidiscrimination prohibition
forbids only one type of unfair treatment-discrimination against an
individual on the basis of his race or color. And even if the aim of fair
employment laws be redistribution, clearly this redistributive goal
is not to be pursued without restraint. The obligation not to discrimi-
nate on the basis of race is the regulatory device for pursuing the
redistributive goal, and the language and structure of that regulatory
device cannot be ignored. The language and structure of the prohibi-
tion have been critical in formulating a general theory for fair employ-
ment laws and in establishing that employers and enforcement agencies
can depart from the norm of color blindness and yet remain within the
limits of the law.
One approach to the analytic problem emphasizes the employer's
motive for choosing the criterion. The central causal concepts of the
antidiscrimination prohibition, such as "based on," "because of," and
"on the grounds of," are given a psychological gloss. They are thought
to refer to the employer's state of mind. The theory is that if the em-
ployer chose the seemingly innocent criterion not to further his business
interests but merely to satisfy his taste for discrimination (or that of his
customers or workers), then the employment decision adversely affecting
Negroes is not based on the innocent criterion but instead on race.
Race is the "real" basis of the job allocation.
Perhaps, as a matter of semantics, it is possible to give the causal
concepts such a psychological gloss. Even so, there are problems with
this approach. One set of problems stems from the difficulties of proof.
It is not just a question of the plaintiff's capacity to prove (or if the
burden shifts, the defendant's capacity to disprove) a state of mind, but,
more importantly, a question of what degree of confidence can be
placed on a court's finding on the motivation issue. These questions are
of some moment because a facially innocent criterion, by its very nature,
always permits an assertion that it was chosen for legitimate business
reasons, unrelated to a desire to exclude blacks. It is true even of the
familiar nepotism example; for nepotism may be used to inculcate
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employee loyalty and to serve as a rough, but effective, screening device,
somewhat like a voucher.
Another set of problems stems from the failure of the psychological
approach to deal adequately with the situation where the employer's
choice of criteria is based on motivation related to efficiency or to a
mixed motive-race and efficiency. In these instances, the court may be
able to make an independent assessment of the employer's alleged non-
racial reasons for his choice and find that these reasons are not "suffi-
cient," leading to the conclusion that only a desire to exclude blacks
could "rationally" or "objectively" explain the use of the criterion. But.
it is hardly a solution to the analytic problem to give the causal terms
a psychological gloss and then "presume" as a matter of law that when-
ever, in the court's judgment, the use of the criteria cannot be justified
on efficiency grounds, the "motivation" of the employer was a racial one.
The bootstrap quality of that reasoning is apparent. Although the
problems of proof stemming from the psychological approach may
indeed be difficult, the franker solution is not to create "legal presump-
tions" about motivation but is, instead, not to give a psychological gloss
to the causal terms of the prohibition.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the psychological approach is
inadequate because it incorrectly conceives the nature of the regulatory
device. Antidiscrimination prohibitions try to regulate by prohibiting
the use of a criterion (race), and generally a violation of the prohibition
does not turn on the motives or reason for the choice of the criterion.
For example, when an election official turns blacks away, his motivation
is irrelevant. It does not make a difference whether blacks are turned
away at the polling place because the voting official hates blacks (is
"prejudiced" or has a "racial animus") or just wants to help a particular
candidate, white or black, whom the blacks are likely to vote against (has
a purely political motivation). Regardless of his particular motivation,
the official has violated the prohibition against racial discrimination by
deciding who is to be turned away on the basis of the individual's color.
The same is true in the employment context when race is the criterion
in question. The employer violates the prohibition when he judges
people on the basis of race, regardless of whether the employer chose
that particular criterion, in whole or in part, because he wants to save
the administrative costs of screening applicants (and uses race as
symptomatic of poor education), because he hates blacks (and wants to
screen out as many as possible), or because he wants to please his cus-
tomers or his workers (who simply wish to maximize their wealth by
limiting the supply of labor or preserving their competitive edge). The
conduct that is regulated is the use of the criterion-judging people on
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the basis of the criterion-and the reasons or motives for the choice of the
criterion are irrelevant under the theory and structure of fair employ-
ment laws. If that structure were for some reason altered in order to deal
with the problem of facially innocent criteria, a series of discordant
problems would be presented.
Another approach to this analytic problem, and one that seems more
satisfactory, focuses on the criterion itself. The theory is that the seem-
ingly innocent criterion is the functional equivalent of "race." Judging
the individual on the basis of this criterion is the equivalent, or near
equivalent, of judging him on the basis of race. There are two steps
necessary to establish functional equivalence. The first is a determina-
tion that the criterion, like race, has or is likely to have an adverse
differential impact on Negroes: the use of the criterion is more likely to
limit the employment opportunities of Negroes as a class than those of
whites. This first step essentially involves an empirical judgment about
the actual or likely consequences or effects of applying the seemingly
innocent criterion. The second step is considerably more difficult. It is
to drain nonperformance under the criterion of any normative power:
failure to satisfy the particular criterion could no more justify the
adverse employment decision than could "race." This second step re-
quires that the two attributes of race that make it an inappropriate
basis for allocating jobs-unrelatedness to productivity and absence of
individual control-also be attributes of the criterion in question.
However, this can be done only through analysis of particular applica-
tions of the criterion; to consider a criterion innocent on its face is
to concede that, unlike race, it is impossible to assert that there would
be unfairness whenever that criterion is used as a basis for allocating
jobs.
Admittedly, this approach takes some liberties with the word "race;"
the law does not prohibit judging an individual on the basis of the
functional equivalent of race but only on race. The virtue of this
approach as a means for overcoming the analytic problem, assuming it
should be overcome, is its consistency with the theory and structure of
a fair employment law as a regulatory device. It focuses attention on the
criterion, or basis of the employment decision, and avoids the difficulties
of the psychological approach; if the criterion is the functional equiva-
lent of race, there need not be a finding of the motivation of the em-
ployer in choosing the criterion.
This is not to deny that an inquiry into the employer's motivation
might be relevant.69 For example, it may assist the court in determining
69 See, e.g., Insulators & Asbestos Workers Local 53 v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047, 1054 (5th
Cir. 1969).
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how blameworthy the employer's conduct is. A tribunal is likely to be
hesitant in holding that an employer has violated any law, even if the
relief in question is totally prospective, without some belief in the
blameworthiness of the employer's conduct. When race itself is the
criterion, the notice provided by the terms of the antidiscrimination
prohibition will be sufficient to establish the blameworthiness of the
employer's conduct. Here an inquiry into motivations-the bona fides
of the employer-might serve the same function.
Similarly, an insight into the employer's state of mind may assist the
court in determining functional equivalence. If the motivation seems
to be connected to a "racial animus," the court is more prepared to
second-guess the primary decision-maker on his choice of criteria. Thus
it seems that whenever the Supreme Court has applied the theory of
functional discrimination (for example, to invalidate literacy tests as
a qualification for voting) it was well aware that the use of the criterion
originated in the most suspicious of circumstances, suggesting that the
motivation for the use of the criterion was a racial one (to disenfranchise
blacks as a means of maintaining their inferior position).70 There was
no doctrinal requirement that there be a racial motivation, and in
some instances not even an explicit speculation as to the likely motiva-
tion. But the presence and significance of the surrounding circum-
stances could scarcely have been ignored, and surely they had an impact.
Even assuming that the theory of functional equivalence "over-
comes" the analytic problem in a manner consistent with the structure
of the antidiscrimination prohibition, the question of the role it should
play in the enforcement of the law remains. Part of the answer to that
question depends on the importance attached to such values as improv-
ing the relative economic position of blacks, insuring fair treatment in
employment decisions, and preventing evasion. For example, the
stronger the commitment to the value of improving the relative eco-
nomic position of blacks (the equal-achievement goal), the rougher the
approximation one will accept in establishing the equivalence.
Indeed, that commitment may lead one even to forget the analytic
problem altogether.71 However, the role of the functional equivalence
70 For example, the literacy test at issue in Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S.
285 (1969), originated with a grandfather clause. See Fiss, Gaston County v. United States:
Fruition of the Freezing Principle, supra note 2, at 386 n.23, 408.
71 See, e.g., Cooper & Sobol, supra note 7, at 1600; Comment, supra note 7. The theory
of functional equivalence might also be responsive to the problems posed by the fact that
the major federal fair employment law-Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964-did not
become effective until July 2, 1965. (Elsewhere the theory might be responsive to statutes
of limitations.) Without such a theory it would have been difficult or impossible to reach
the clear discriminatory employment practices occurring before the effective date of the
law, and that are perpetuated by the use-after the effective date-of such criteria as
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theory in enforcing fair employment laws may also turn on an aware-
ness of certain conceptual and evidentiary difficulties in applying the
theory-in establishing that a facially innocent criterion is the equiva-
lent of race and determining the appropriate remedy once that equiva-
lence is established. These difficulties may be of no moment with a
criterion such as nepotism, but they are considerable when criteria
such as seniority and testing are at issue.
Establishing the Functional Equivalence. In order to establish a
functional equivalence, it might be determined that the criterion, like
race, is unrelated to productivity. Nepotism and seniority do not appear
to be accurate predictors of productivity72 The more difficult determi-
nation involves criteria expressly designed to predict productivity, such
as standardized tests. One difficulty involved in evaluating such cri-
teria stems from the fact that the concept of predictiveness is a relative
one. The question raised by such a seemingly innocent criterion is not
whether nonperformance is predictive vel non but rather how predic-
tive. The theory is that it is almost as poor a predictor as race, but there
is no absolute or a priori measure of a "poor" predictor. A further
complication arises because the relation of a criterion to productivity is
not simply a function of its accuracy as a predictor78 It may pay to use
a poor predictor if the costs of administering or developing alternative
predictors would exceed the value of the increase in productivity that
would result from an increase in the accuracy of the predictor. Thus,
seniority and nepotism. This cannot ordinarily explain a concern with the use of other
facially innocent criteria, such as aptitude tests or high school graduation. Moreover, some
question can be raised about the propriety of the concern with pre-effective date employ-
ment practices, even if it is assumed that they are discriminatory; and, in any event, this
concern seems to be transitory. It has been pronounced during the five years immediately
following the effective date of Title VII, but it is likely to wane in the future.
72 To the extent that seniority measures experience, it has an ability-testing function.
This ability-testing function can sometimes he separately identified, as for example, when
the employer uses two criteria couched in terms of experience. An example is where a
building trades union uses two seniority criteria for determining priority for referrals-
experience in the industry and experience under the collective agreement. See, e.g., United
States v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 36, 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969); Dobbins v. Local 212,
IBEW, 292 F. Supp. 413 (S.D. Ohio 1968). For an analysis of criteria explicitly designed
to measure future performance, see Note, Legal Implications of the Use of Standardized
Ability Tests in Employment and Education, 68 COLUm. L. Rxv. 691 (1968); Cooper &
Sobol, supra note 7, at 1637.
7a Cooper & Sobol, supra note 7, at 1668, state their rule in the following terms:
The use of even a valid test should not be permitted where the test has a serious
adverse impact on minorities and the party challenging the test can show there
are available alternative devices with less adverse racial impact which seem to
measure the same qualities with equal or greater validity.
As one gathers from this statement and the examples that follow, little account seems to
be taken of the costs of validating tests or of the costs of administration of alternative
techniques; and if it is possible to coerce a businessman to incur these costs, I fail to see
why he cannot be coerced to train the applicant for a typist job who does not quite come
up to standards-a case they concede to be beyond the reach of the law.
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whether the criterion is conducive to productivity turns on four com-
plex and interrelated judgments: (a) the accuracy of the predictor in
question; (b) the accuracy that can be obtained by alternative means
of predicting (either ones that are currently available or ones that can
be developed); (c) the costs of developing better predictors; 74 and (d)
the costs of administering the alternative predictors. True, these factors
were not considered in determining whether race was related to produc-
tivity; fair employment laws forbid the use of race even if the cost of
imperfect prediction would be offset, for example, by the saving in
administering the criterion. But several of the important reasons for
that construction are not present when dealing with facially innocent
criteria. The ban on the symptomatic use of race was in part based on a
desire to avoid the complications and inefficiencies of excepting what is
presumably an atypical use of race, and it is also based on the similarity
in appearance of the symptomatic and wrongful uses of race. In the case
of facially innocent criteria, there is neither the appearance nor much
empirical base to assume that the employer is using a criterion that is
unrelated to productivity. It is obviously in the employer's self-interest
to insure that the criterion is conducive to productivity. There may be
situations where the regulatory power of the market is inadequate-
perhaps the same situation that would prompt the wealth-maximizing
employer to use race; yet it is impossible to assume that those situations
could account for all or most uses of these productivity-oriented cri-
teria.
Once it is established that the seemingly innocent criterion is almost
as unrelated to productivity as race, there remains, of course, the task
of determining whether the individual is responsible for his failure to
satisfy the criterion. Lack of individual control is one of the attributes
of race that accounts for the unfairness inherent in its use as a basis of
allocating scarce employment opportunities. It should also be required
to establish functional equivalence, unless the obligation of the anti-
discrimination prohibition is reduced to a ban on the use of "poor"
predictors that have a differential impact. The lack of individual con-
trol seems necessary to establish the unfairness in using the criterion;
and for this purpose past discrimination against the racial class is
74 The costs of developing alternative predictors include personnel costs (e.g., persons
to devise tests, administer the tests, and interview workers), and the costs of maintaining
the necessary records. If the aim is to obtain a validated test, that is, one that accurately
predicts performance for all groups, there will also be the risk of costs arising from the
lessening of productivity; for the validation of a test involves assembling a representative
sample of applicants, selecting the workers on a random basis, giving the test to all of
the applicants selected on this random basis, putting them to work for some period of
time, and then measuring their level of performance to determine what correlation, if
any, exists between it and the test score. See Note, supra note 72, at 696.
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relevant. Past discrimination may have impaired the individuals' ability
to satisfy the criteria and has put the victims at a competitive disadvan-
tage as compared to whites. For example, discrimination in the public
educational system or exclusion from company training programs may
be the explanation for poor performance on a test. Or past discrimina-
tion may limit the capacity of blacks to meet criteria that do have an
explicit reference to time, such as seniority rules. In either case, the
court must attempt to reconstruct the past and, perhaps more impor-
tantly, must distinguish between the past wrongs that are an inevitable
part of the socialization or development process and those that are of such
unique, systematic character as to relieve the individual of responsi-
bility for his nonperformance while holding most others responsible for
their nonperformance.
Outside of the employment area, such as in voting, the unfairness of
using a seemingly innocent criterion may be established if this lack of
individual control, perhaps attributable to past discrimination, is estab-
lished. The courts have spoken about the "perpetuation" of past
discrimination. However, in the employment context, unrelatedness to
productivity must also be established. Even assuming that the indi-
vidual was never in a position to bring himself within the terms of the
criterion, that it can be explained on the ground of past discrimination
against his class, the law is not prepared to coerce the businessman to
incur the costs involved in hiring the (admittedly) less productive
worker or of training him so as to increase his productivity. The em-
ployer's interest in wealth maximization and the rigors of the market-
place are generally acknowledged in fair employment laws. A fair
employment law is a limited corrective strategy and the societal interest
in efficiency is a major limitation. This interest in efficiency is compro-
mised not only when the employer is required to take an "unqualified"
worker but also when he is not allowed to choose "the best worker."
Thus, in the employment context, if the individual's nonperformance
under the criterion indicates a lower productivity than that of another
applicant (for example, the applicant for a secretarial job cannot type
at all or cannot type as well as the best applicant), this criterion cannot
be deemed the functional equivalent of race, regardless of the individ-
ual's lack of responsibility for his nonperformance. Past discrimination
-the causal explanation that releases the individual from responsibility
for his nonperformance-becomes relevant only if the criterion is not
indicative of productivity. A limited exception may be made when the
government is the employer and the costs are spread throughout society.
Conceivably, another exception may be made when the employer him-
self is responsible for the imposition of the disability. For instance, the
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past discrimination may occur in the company training program, rather
than in the public educational system. Then the law may be more pre-
pared to coerce the employer to incur costs by providing training op-
portunities; he has the remedial obligation to correct the effects of his
discrimination. But both of these instances seem marginal. The general
obligation of the employer should be and has been formulated from a
different perspective.
Fashioning the Remedy. Even if it is determined that the employer's
use of a seemingly innocent criterion is the functional equivalent of
using race, the problem of fashioning a remedy remains. Obviously, an
order commanding the employer not to use race for allocating jobs is
il-suited to the task. What remedy, then, would be both effective and
fair?
One possible remedial order is a flat ban on the use of the seemingly
innocent criterion: the particular employer is ordered not to apply the
criterion to anyone. This may be done with the nepotism rule or a
requirement that the applicant have a high school diploma. The remedy
appears evenhanded-whites and blacks will be treated alike. But, to a
limited degree, that appearance is misleading. A benefit is conferred
upon a group that consists primarily of blacks, and a disadvantage is
imposed on a class that consists primarily of whites. This is so because
a finding of functional equivalence necessarily implies that the use of
the criterion has a differential impact on whites as a class and blacks
as a class. Likewise, a flat ban on use of the criterion will have a differ-
ential impact on the two classes. The person who would otherwise be
unable to meet the criterion receives a benefit; the person who could
otherwise have satisfied the criterion is disadvantaged because his
competitive edge is nullified.
This conferral of benefit and disadvantage becomes of more signifi-
cance in the employment context than in voting. Abolishing a literacy
test as a qualification for voting confers benefits and disadvantages in
much the same way as abolishing a requirement of high school gradua-
tion does in employment. But enfranchising an illiterate, though it may
dilute the literate's vote, neither deprives the literate of the vote nor
puts the illiterate in a position to deprive the literate of the vote. They
are not in competition with one another. Each can vote. In employment,
a scarce opportunity must be allocated: the job that goes to one cannot
go to the other (although the unsuccessful applicant may not be de-
prived of all employment). However, if functional equivalence between
race and the criterion is established, the stricture against preferential
treatment based on race would not be violated: prohibiting the use of
this criterion confers a benefit that is identical to the benefit conferred
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by prohibiting the use of race. The antidiscrimination prohibition-
even in its color-blind version-improves the competitive position of
blacks.
A flat ban on the use of a criterion has the appearance of evenhanded-
ness, but often it is not an appropriate or a practical remedy. This may
be due to political considerations. For example, the use of seniority,
even if found to be nonconducive to productivity and even if the non-
performance of blacks under the criterion is attributable to past dis-
crimination, is not likely to be totally prohibited. The impact upon the
incumbent workers, mostly white but including some blacks, would be
too great, and that constituency can make its power felt in ways that
would preclude or undo any flat ban on the use of seniority. Or the
remedial alternative of a ban may be unavailable because of considera-
tions of economic efficiency. For example, the written test in question
may be a poor predictor, but it is the only one available in the immedi-
ate future. Banning it may decrease productivity or, because of the
costs of developing new validated tests, prompt an increase in the price
of goods and services. Indeed, if a decree prohibits the use of the
criterion altogether and an increasing number of facially innocent
criteria come within the sweep of such decrees, the risk that employers
will use the not so innocent criterion-race-increases. Some employ-
ers may use this to the advantage of blacks; others may use it to the
advantage of whites.
Thus, what is often necessary is a more tailored decree-one that
permits use of the criterion but tries to remove the discrimination. The
process of formulating the tailored decree involves two critical phases:
delineating the class of beneficiaries and equalizing the effect of the
criterion on this class of beneficiaries.
Theoretically, the defining characteristic of the class of beneficiaries
is that they are victims of discrimination; and, as with the traditional
theory of fair employment laws, it is not troubling that the race of the
class turns out to be black. However, as a practical matter, race is likely
to play a large role in defining the class of beneficiaries, and the racial
composition of the benefited class is more than a mere coincidence. In
the testing situation, for example, it would practically be impossible to
define in advance and in nonracial terms those victims of discrimination
whose scores must be adjusted in order to neutralize the influence of
past discrimination in the public educational system. Instead, the color
black is likely to be used symptomatically to identify "victims of dis-
crimination"; the class of beneficiaries becomes coextensive with the
color black. At most, there is an insincere promise to exclude the non-
disadvantaged black from the benefit of the decree wherever he is found.
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The same symptomatic use of the color black and the expansion of
the class of beneficiaries seem inevitable when the criterion is seniority
and the question is who should not be disadvantaged because they have
not accumulated as much seniority as whites. For the all-white com-
pany, which has never hired blacks, race plays a predominant role,
although there may be further delineation of the class in terms of age
and residence. The theory is that to hold individuals, who were denied
the opportunity to work in the plant because of their race, to the same
seniority standards as whites would be to discriminate against them on
the basis of their race. A delineation of the class of beneficiaries in terms
of those blacks who actually applied to the company in the past but
were turned away because of their race would seem too limited: the
evidentiary problems of identifying those individuals would be enor-
mous, and this limitation of the class would not take sufficient account
of the ripple effect of discriminatory action and of discouragement
through images. Where there are racially segregated departments, and
the challenge is to the use of seniority in the white department, a delinea-
tion of the beneficiaries in terms of incumbent black employees is likely.
On one level, this delineation is over-inclusive because it benefits those
who would not have been admitted to the white department regardless
of racial considerations. On another level, it is under-inclusive. It fails
to include those blacks who were not hired because of limitations on
the number of job openings in the black department there and those
who would not even apply because of the discriminatory practices. It
may, of course, be difficult to identify these individual victims, and this
creates pressure to expand the class of beneficiaries beyond the incum-
bent black employees to include blacks in the community who satisfy
certain age and residence requirements. If the class of beneficiaries is
not so expanded, the remedial order, and thus the resources consumed
in the litigation, would do no more than improve the position of a
limited number of older blacks who were prepared to serve in the
segregated black department over a long number of years.
Once the class of beneficiaries is delineated, the decree must neutral-
ize the discriminatory effect of the criterion. Assuming a situation where
the use of the criterion is still permitted, "credit" must be given to the
class of beneficiaries to offset their nonperformance. This credit could
be conferred "explicitly." For example, some number of points would
be added to the test score of the beneficiaries or some quantity of
seniority given to offset the nonaccumulation. Credit could also be
given to the beneficiaries indirectly by lowering the standards by which
they are judged-by creating a double standard. Or credit could be
given indirectly by downgrading or devaluating the performance of
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those outside the class of beneficiaries; for example, the tribunal could
order the employer to limit the amount of seniority an employee out-
side of the class of beneficiaries could use for competitive purposes. In
formulating an order that does not prohibit the use of the criterion
altogether, the central question is: how much credit should be given
to the class of beneficiaries?
The answer is easy enough when stated in general terms; enough
credit should be given that the beneficiaries are assured equal treatment
or their "rightful" place.75 But it is extraordinarily difficult to give
specific content to such a tautological answer. The task confronting the
tribunal is not to devise a formula to give the job to the class of bene-
ficiaries or to eliminate the differential impact of the criterion-to make
the test scores or accumulated seniority quantitatively identical. Instead,
the task is to eliminate only that portion of the differential impact
attributable to past discrimination. At that point the functional equiva-
lence between the seemingly innocent criterion and race ceases, and so
does the justification for giving any credit. And the difficulty of locating
that point with any degree of accuracy is obvious. How many points
should be added to the test score of the beneficiaries to cancel the effects
of past discrimination in the educational system? How much time will
account for the loss of accumulated time attributable to the past exclu-
sionary practices of the company or industry? In the seniority case where
there are racially segregated departments and the remedy is limited to
incumbent blacks who wish to compete, there may be some rough
approximations, such as company seniority. But obviously the approxi-
mation is very rough, for it rests on the unrealistic assumption that,
without the past practices, the incumbent blacks (the beneficiaries)
would have started work in the white department at the same time as
they did in the black one and would have continued in the white depart-
ment in the same fashion as they did in the black one.
These difficulties in computing the appropriate credit are of some
moment. They not only make the remedial enterprise more compli-
cated but they also create a risk of transforming the remedial order into
a mechanism for securing not equal but preferential treatment for the
class of beneficiaries. The tailored decree avoids a conflict with the stric-
ture against preferential treatment based on race if it observes two limita-
tions. The first is that, even though the class of beneficiaries may be
predominantly, if not exclusively, blacks, the benefits are not being con-
ferred because of their race but because they are victims of discrimina-
tion. Race is used to identify beneficiaries, but it is being used
75 See generally Note, Title VII, Seniority Discrimination and the Incumbent Negro,
80 I-IAv. L. REv. 1260 (1967).
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symptomatically, along with some other criteria, to identify the victims.
Benefits are not conferred on these individuals because of race, but (in
much the same way as any version of the fair employment law works)
because there is no way, in the immediate future, to end the discrimina-
tion other than by requiring action (giving credit) that entails confer-
ring benefits. The second limitation is that the benefit conferred is
limited. It will result only in the applicant being treated equally. So
long as the credit does no more than neutralize the discriminatory
effect of the criterion, the claim can be made that, notwithstanding the
outward appearance of unequal treatment (the additional credit), the
beneficiaries are merely treated equally and thus the remedy is con-
sistent with the theory of a fair employment law. The familiar analogy
is the handicap race. However, just as too small a handicap leaves the
discrimination uncorrected, too great a handicap gives an unjustifiable
advantage-not equal but preferential treatment. Obviously those
competitors without the handicap are unlikely to accept someone else's
assurance that not too much has been given, and the protestations can-
not be lightly dismissed as assertions of limited self-interest when there
are such enormous difficulties in doing the job correctly. 6
The difficulties in identifying the class of beneficiaries and in com-
puting the appropriate credit parallel the difficulties inherent in de-
termining that the prohibition was violated. In that regard there were
difficulties in determining whether the criterion is related to produc-
tivity and the individual's responsibility for his nonperformance, assess-
ments which are necessary to conclude that a seemingly innocent
criterion is the functional equivalent of race. These difficulties, both in
fashioning the remedy and in concluding that there ,is an equivalence,
make the process of evaluating facially innocent criteria a costly one.
One facet of the costs is ethical: at each step of the analysis, the tribunal
is called upon to make treacherous decisions about individual responsi-
bility and competitive fairness. The risk of error is high, and there is
little chance of agreement as to the correctness of those judgments. In
addition, this process of evaluation consumes significant economic
resources. My concern does not relate simply to the resources consumed
by a protracted adjudicatory process, or to the inefficiencies that could
76 This is dearly illustrated in Papermakers & Paperworkers Local 189 v. United States,
416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), where, at various points of time, three different public agencies
charged with enforcing an antidiscrimination prohibition-the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission, the Office of Federal Contract Compliance, and the Department
of Justice--had taken quite different views as to the amount of seniority "credit" that had
to be given to incumbent black employees, and none of these agencies, nor the court, was
prepared to extend the class of beneficiaries to embrace nonincumbent blacks, that is,
blacks who had not remained at the company but who nonetheless might have been the
victims of the past discriminatory practices of the employe.
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be imposed on the good businessman through a mistaken adjudication,
thereby increasing the costs of goods and services. Instead, my concern
stems primarily from the unlikelihood of any real payoff from the in-
vestment. It is unlikely that the results of any single litigation could be
generalized or become the basis of any significant measure of voluntary
compliance. As we have seen, one aspect of the theory of fair employ-
ment laws was that the costs of enforcement could be kept down
through voluntary compliance; all employers knew that race was for-
bidden and could act accordingly. In this important regard, no facially
innocent criterion will ever be the general equivalent of race: it is im-
possible to formulate a legal prohibition against the use of the criterion
in the same way that fair employment laws embody a prohibition
against race. The legality of a criterion depends on many complicated
facts, such as those necessary to make a determination that it has an
adverse impact, that it is not conducive to productivity, and that the
individual is not responsible for nonperformance. These facts vary
from case to case, with only a limited potential for developing per se
rules. With the criteria that really count, not nepotism but testing and
seniority, there is no single or typical set of facts that would allow the
tribunal to generalize the rule to cover all employment decisions within
the reach of the fair employment law. The litigation in voting cul-
minated in a nationwide ban on literacy tests; 77 but it is impossible to
contemplate that outcome in employment-at least today.
It is these considerations, not the obvious departure from the norm
of color blindness, that raise doubts about the wisdom of the evaluative
process related to facially innocent criteria admittedly applied to
everyone in the same way. These costs may not be sufficient to cause
the courts to shrink altogether from this type of evaluation; the courts
have embarked on the enterprise, and there may be good practical
reasons for continuing. These reasons stem from the risks of the alterna-
tive posture, that is, one where facially innocent criteria are immune to
or insulated from attack under the fair employment law. This second
posture would enable those who wish to satisfy a taste for discrimination
to do so in an indirect fashion, and it may well have disastrous effects
on the achievement of the aggregate economic goal-that of improving
the relative economic position of Negroes. The blanket legitimation of
facially innocent criteria might well result in the perpetuation of the
inferior economic position of blacks and thus frustrate one possible aim
of fair employment laws.
These pragmatic reasons suggest a purpose for continuing the enter-
77 Title II of Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314;
United States v. Arizona, 91 S. Ct. 260 (1970).
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prise of evaluating facially innocent criteria. But they are not sufficient
reason for mounting a massive indiscriminate enforcement program.
The difficulties inherent in making the judgments and the individual-
ized nature of any conclusion of functional equivalence suggest that the
rational law enforcement policy is to save this analysis for exceptional
cases. Those are likely to arise where the merit principle is not able to
protect itself; a prime example is the criteria used to establish priorities
in a union-controlled referral system, such as in the building trades
industry. A properly selective use of the theory of functional equiva-
lence would preclude the wholesale legitimation of all facially inno-
cent criteria and keep some pressure on employers to develop criteria
that are not near-cousins of race. At the same time it would mini-
mize the societal costs involved in using this theory.
3. The Affirmative-Action Duty. My formulation of a theory of fair
employment laws and the analysis of the departures from color blindness
have been based on an idealized version of a fair employment law, a
prototype abstracted from any particular setting. It consists of nothing
more than a command to employers not to discriminate on the basis of
race or color. That seems to be the central regulatory device of laws
prohibiting racial discrimination. There is, however, one phrase in
both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Executive Order
that has become an important appendage to the central regulatory de-
vice. That is the phrase "affirmative action." It has recently been used
with greater frequency. 8 And it no longer remains just a detail of
language. Instead, it has given rise to a duty-the affirmative-action
duty.
The affirmative-action duty does not purport to supplant the duty not
to discriminate, nor could it be understood independently of the duty
not to discriminate The assumption is that the employer's basic duty is
not to discriminate and the affirmative-action duty is just "one step"
beyond that. In the typical scenario, the enforcement agency tells the
employer that he not only must refrain from discrimination but also
must undertake "affirmative action." The employer asks what "affirma-
tive action" is: "What is it I have to do?" The response of the enforce-
ment agency is essentially one of silence. It says: "Just as you use your
ingenuity in solving other business problems, you should use your
ingenuity in solving this one." The most the agency is willing to do is
to provide a few clues as to what "affirmative action" might entail. The
agency mentions an aggressive informational program for blacks as one
78 See, e.g., United States v. Local 38, IBEW, 428 F.2d 144 (6th Cir. 1970); Insulators &
Asbestos Workers Local 53 v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969); Weiner v. Cuyahoga
Community College Dist., 19 Ohio St. 2d 35, 249 N.E.2d 907 (1969).
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example. It then quickly adds that this example is not meant to ex-
haust the employer's affirmative-action obligation.
There are several possible explanations for the agency's failure to ex-
plain what the affirmative-action duty entails. The first is that the agency
does not know. The phrase "affirmative action" is unintelligible to the
agency. In that instance the use of the phrase is obviously inexcusable.
I do not believe that effective law enforcement results from, or is in any
way furthered by, using concepts the meaning of which is not clear to
either speaker or listener.
A second explanation for the silence is that the term "affirmative ac-
tion" has no descriptive meaning but is used simply as an exhortation.
It means "Think right." It is the agency's way of urging the employer to
be more concerned with the problem of racial discrimination. I see little
place for exhortations in law enforcement. The necessity for enforce-
ment action itself suggests that the employer is not "thinking right,"
not sufficiently concerned with discrimination, and a simple exhortation
is unlikely to cause a change. What is necessary for law enforcement
that is both effective and efficient-free of interminable negotiations or
motions for supplemental relief-is clarity and specificity, not ex-
hortations.
A third explanation for the silence is embarrassment. Although the
term may have descriptive meaning and although the agency may know
that meaning, the agency is embarrassed to say what it means. This
embarrassment is, of course, not attributable to social graces; it is more
likely attributable to fear of the political consequences of informing the
employer precisely what is expected of him or to the uncertainty on
the part of the agency as to the legality of the action it wants the em-
ployer to take. The agency wants the employer to do anything that is
necessary to increase the number of black workers or to improve the
relative economic position of Negroes. Of course, one means of doing
that is to give blacks a preference because of their color. In this instance,
the phrase "affirmative action" is a technique for avoiding the political
or legal consequences of the agency's directive.
If this is the explanation for its silence, the agency is acting irre-
sponsibly. An agency's accountability would be completely un-
dermined if it could obscure its directives and enforcement policies by
steadfastly refusing to explain the meaning of a term that plays a central
role in those directives and policies. Moreover, there is no suggestion
that the "affirmative action" concept, as it appears in the laws in ques-
tion, means that the obligation of the employer is to increase the num-
ber of blacks employed. In Title VII its meaning is purely remedial.79
79 Section 706(g) provides: "If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally
1971]
The University of Chicago Law Review
It means that, once the tribunal has found that the employer has dis-
criminated, the court may order the employer to engage in action to
correct the effects of the discrimination, even if this action may be
considered "affirmative" and not otherwise specifically authorized by
the statute. Reinstatement and hiring, with or without the payment of
back wages, are the statutory examples. The suggestion is that the cor-
rective action ordered by the court need not be specifically authorized or
required by the antidiscrimination prohibition in itself. However, there
is no suggestion that the remedial obligation of the employer-even if
it is established that he has discriminated-is simply to increase the
number of blacks, and much less that that goal could be achieved in
ways that transgress the basic prohibition of the statute.
This also seems to be true with the term "affirmative action" as used
in the Executive Order.80 In that instance it seems to mean that the
government contractor may be required to incur greater expenses or
inefficiencies to help insure against racial discrimination-a policy
that may be justified on the assumption that the increased costs will be
borne by the government and spread throughout society.8' There is no
suggestion that the basic obligation of the government contractor is to
increase the number of blacks hired and no suggestion that he is per-
mitted or obliged to allocate scarce employment opportunities on the
basis of color for the purpose of fulfilling that obligation. If that were
the obligation of the Executive Order, there would be a conflict with
Title VII and a serious question about the constitutional authority of
engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in
the complaint, the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful
employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which
may include reinstatement or.hiring of employees, with or without back pay . . . ." 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1964). Courts have granted analogous relief without specific statutory
authorization, finding the power in general equity principles. See, e.g., United States v.
Alabama, 192 F. Supp. 677 (M.D. Ala. 1961), aff'd, 304 F.2d 583 (5th Cir.), aff'd per curiam,
371 U.S. 37 (1962) (list of 54 Negroes to be registered to vote). See also cases cited in Fiss,
Gaston County v. United States: Fruition of the Freezing Principle, supra note 2, %at
396 n.47.
80 Executive Order 11,246 requires that all government contracting agencies include in
every contract the following provision:
During the performance of this contract, the contractor agrees as follows:
(I) The contractor will not discriminate against any employee or applicant for
employment because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. The con-
tractor will take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed, and
that employees are treated during employment, without regard to their race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin. ...
8 C.F.R. 167 (1965), as amended Exec. Order No. 11,375, 3 C.F.R. 320 (1967), 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e (Supp. III, 1965-67).
81 In Weiner v. Cuyahoga Community College Dist., 19 Ohio St. 2d 85, 88, 249 N.E.2d
907, 910 (1969), the court suggests that the increased cost due to a requirement to under-
take affirmative action might be offset by the avoidance of the costs attendant on traditional
means of enforcing fair employment laws.
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the Executive to impose such obligations. 2 But there is no conflict. The
basic obligation remains one of not discriminating, even though, when
this obligation is scrupulously obeyed or pursued at some expense, the
result or consequence may be an increase in the number of blacks. The
government contractor promises to take "affirmative action to ensure
that applicants are employed... without regard to their race," and he
also promises not to discriminate on the basis of race or color.
To argue for a short life for the affirmative-action duty and to suggest
that it should not be the concept that supplants color blindness does not
mean that a court cannot require the employer who has been found to
discriminate to take what might be considered affirmative steps. In-
stead, I would suggest that the courts usually do precisely that, and that
in the remedial area the distinction between affirmative and negative
action is not a helpful one. Indeed, it has long been recognized that
there is an inherent power of an equity court to require the defendant
to take affirmative steps to undo or correct the effects of his wrongful
conduct.8 3 To the extent that it is not redundant, the affirmative-action
concept is either meaningless or inconsistent with the prohibition
against discrimination. Most often it is used simply as a bluff.
III. CONCLUSION
The essential quality of the antidiscrimination prohibition as applied
to employment decisions is not color blindness. In my judgment, there
are two other qualities that are the key to understanding: first, that the
antidiscrimination prohibition is a strategy for conferring benefits on a
racial class-blacks-and, second, that as a benefit-conferring strategy
it is limited. It does no more than prohibit discrimination on the basis
of race. The limited nature of this legal strategy is not just a function
of the circumstances of politics but rather reflects a deep commitment to
the values of economic efficiency and individual fairness. The most
troublesome question is whether the historical legacy of the class will,
or should, moderate that commitment so as to yield, through enactment
82 Id. at 39. In his opinion on the legality of the Philadelphia Plan, the Attorney
General takes the position that the affirmative action entails the duty to increase minority
employment, but not in a manner that would conflict with Title VII. Senate Hearings
on the Philadelphia Plan at 276-79. See note 49 supra.
83 See, e.g., Fiss, Racial Imbalance in the Public Schools: The Constitutional Concepts,
supra note 2, at 612; United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 872 F.2d 836, 868
(5th Cir. 1966), aff'd en banc, 380 F.2d 385 (1967); and Green v. County School Bd., 391
U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968), where the Court said: "School boards such as the respondent then
operating state-compelled dual systems were nevertheless clearly charged with the affirmative
duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which
racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch." See also Griffin v. County
School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
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or construction, a more robust strategy for the law. The legacy supplies
an ethical basis for the desire to improve the relative economic position
of blacks, and yet it also explains why a law that does no more than
prohibit discrimination on the basis of race will leave that desire, in
large part, unfulfilled.
